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The Essential Gombrich: Selected Writing_ on Art and Culture, ed.
Richard Woodfield, London: Phaidon, 1996.
E. H. Gombrich, as the cliche has it, needs no introduction. Amongst so many
other things, an iconologist especially familiar with both the decorative and high
arts of the Medieval and Renaissance periods, Gombrich would appreciate the
extent to which he has himself become an icon (even while disavowing the fact).
A review of a selection of his writings will remain primarily a review of the
selection, therefore, and only secondarily of the writings-of Gombrich himself
as a writer and thinker, that is. This being the case, I should say at the outset that
I share the feeling that Gombrich himself expresses in the book's 'Foreword':
accepting that the task promised by thc word 'essential' of compiling a truly
representativc sclcction is one that is 'impossible of fulfilment', 'Mr Woodfield
has done his difficult job bettcr than I thought possiblc' (p.7). Indeed, onc of the
first and abiding imprcssions given by the volumc's scrupulous editorial
organisation and presentation is of its being a personal tributc from Richard
Woodfield to a famous historian and theoretician of art and from thc Phaidon
publishing company to onc whose inunensely popular, carcfully and consistcntly
re-edited The Story ofArt must have been central to thcir financial enterprisc since
1950.
Woodfield has divided his selection of writings from various-very various-
pcriodicals and from Gombrich's fourteen 'Principal Works' (listed scparatcly
here at the end of the editorial 'Introduction') into cleven categories that pretend
neither to an overall organisational principle nor to mutual cxclusivencss, though
thc heading of each category c1carly informs the readcr of its common thrcad:
'Autobiographical'; 'The Visual Image'; 'Art and Psychology'; 'Tradition and
Innovation'; 'Psychology and thc Decorative Arts'; 'Primitivism and the Primitive';
'On the Nature of Art History'; 'Alternatives to "The Spirit of the Age" '; 'On the
Mcanings of Works of Art'; 'High Art and Popular Cultun:'; 'Gombrich from
within Tradition'. Each category contains bctween two and five essays and/or
excerpts, amounting to a total of thirty onc in all and of 570-odd pages of
Gombrich text with (so far as I can ascertain from a spot check of about a third of
the contributions) all the original illustrations, proximate throughout to their
tcxtual citations and if sometimes reduced from thcir first appcarance, only to
better rclative effect.
The Essential Gombrich, then, is a judiciously sclected and highly selectivc
yet still generous garnishing from a massivc body of writings over a sixty year
pcriod--especially judiciously selected in that Woodfield, having chosen a specific
article and/or chapter does not then attempt any further, highly unrepresentative
cditing of thc kind that parcs down pages to passagcs or sentences and eliminatcs
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what it takes to be all digressions or illustrations irrelevant to a main argument.
Prescrved throughout is Gombrich's careful, accumulative approach through a
clear articulation of both thc problem and the possibilities under consideration, an
inclusive approach that somehow manages to avoid repetition or redundancy,
written in a perspicuous language that somehow manages to avoid naivety: 'To
talk cleverly about art is not very difficult, because the words critics use have been
employed in so many different contexts that they havc lost all precision' (p.80).
Gombrich may distinguish work like The Story of Art written for a general
audience from his morc academic and theoretical work, but the prose of ncither is
ever less than accessibly clear, laying itself open to critical attention unashamedly
for assent, refinement, or refutation.
Indeed, thc volumc as a whole gives the strong impression of a single, if not an
'cssential' Gombrich; a Gombrich who resists any such tidy divisions as
Woodfield's identification of 'cffcctively, three separate careers: the publicly
acclaimed author of The Story of Art, the recondite scholar of the Italian
Renaissance, and the famous commentator on the psychology of pictorial
representation' (p.ll). The activities of the critical historian of art and of the
aesthetician are not, in other words, as distinct as might appear from this trinity;
both aesthetician and historian address the 'curious fact' that Gombrich
acknowledges as fundamental (the observation was Wolfflin's): 'not everything
is possible in every pcriod' (p.84). 'To explain this curious fact is not the art
historian's duty' Gombrich continues in his introduction to Art and Illusion
(1960), 'but whose business is it?' The question is, of course, rhetorical; Gombrich
had been making it his business to explain why it is 'that different ages and
different nations have represented thc world in such different ways' (p.83) for
twenty years and continued to make 'the implicit rcllection on art-historical
method' his business on and off for the next twenty (p.367).
It is not just the aesthetic ian and art historian whom Gombrich would reconcile,
moreover; he would also build a 'much-needed bridge between thc field of art
history and the domain of the practising artist', evolving a common language that,
'if luck would have it', might be extended 'even to the scientific studcnt of
perception' (p.88). Indeed, in his own unpretentious way, Gombrich aspires to an
inclusive 'science of art'-'My main interest has always been in more general
types of cxplanation, which meant a certain kinship with science.... In history we
record, but in science we try to explain single cvcnts by referring them to a general
regularity' (pp.34-5)-an enterprise that brings togcther the academic art historian,
curator, practising artist, biologist, sociologist, psychologist, and (ut pictura
poesis) linguist. What he has in mind is an historicised 'cultural psychology' of
aesthetic perception (adopting Aby Warburg's term [p.31)): 'my ambition-and
it was rather a lofty one-was to be a kind of commentator ... on what actually
happened in the development of art' (p.34).
Just how 'scientific' is this aspiration of Gombrich's is glimpsed in his
choosing to publish his study of 'The Visual Imagc: Its Place in Communication'
in Scientific American (Vol. 272, 1972; reproduced here as pp.41--64). One is
reminded of the origin of semiotics in linguist de Saussurc's dream of a 'science
of signs', except that in Gombrich 'the linguistics of the visual image' (p.87) is
informed throughout by the irrepressibly historical sense of 'the so-called "Vienna
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School" of art history' (p.38) and the Germanic philologists. 'For Gombrich', as
Woodfield reminds us, 'an awareness of thc past is a necessary part of heing
civilized' (p.9). Such reconciliations or compromises-contradictions?-are
characteristic of one whose philosophy, like his science, is instinctively allied to
an empirical and experimental tradition. Constructivism or conventionalism
sits comfortably (for Gomhrich. at least) with rcpresentationalism; Romantic
transcendentalism and' "the canon of excellencc" in art'-those 'household
gods, the divinities of that middle-class religion known as Bildung' (p.38}--
with scientific detenninism and historicist revisionism. His is an endeavour to
account for diverse sorts of perception and to do justice to them all by (literally
and metaphorically) shifting the focus of his critical gaze, forty odd years ago
aspiring to an 'aesthetics heyond aesthetics' of the kind towards which Wolgang
Welsch in his article in this issue would have us aspire in the future, an aesthetics
that takes in 'the inner polyaesthetics of art and art's transartistic entanglements;
an aesthetics which is capahle of considering all dimensions of aistJzesis. ...
I imagine aesthetics being a field of research which comprehends all questions
concerning aislhesis, with the inclusion of contributions from philosophy,
sociology, art history, psychology, anthropology, neurosciences, and so on'.
The question remains, however, as to just how compatible the various ideas
and disciplines so effortlessly blcnded in Gomhrich' s gcnially accessible prose
really are. The price of that very accessibility is often an in<.\ifference to critical
debate-and an indifference to scientific dissent amongst psychologists, animal
hehaviourists, and neuro-physiologists, for that maller. Indeed, the samc
accessibility seems to have induced a comparahlc critical rcticence in Woodfield,
whose few attempts in his Editorial Notes to qcfend Gomhrich's work against
past misreadings and to promote his theory in the face of past and future dissent
(e.g., pp.111-2; 159-60; 378--80; 527) only invoke an ohligation to attend more
consistently and with more critical rigour to that <.\issent than he does.
This is not to ignore Woodfield's suhstantial agreement with Gombrich (we
might defend to the death the right of an antagonist to say what hc or she likes but
we are unlikely to volunteer to edit his or her 'essential works') or his conviction
that an epitome of chosen writings is not the place to be carrying on a running
argument (the occasional, 'conclusive' nourish aside [e.g., p.81)). Nor is it to
ignore the obvious attraction of Woodfield's economic and unpedantic e<.\iting.
Arguably, little more is necessary or even desirable in this context than the
practice adopted by Woodfield of occasionally registering that there have been
disagreements and of including reference to a representati ve number of examples.
How adequate these are to the extent and variety of that critical <.\issent is another
question, however; on Gomhrich on art and illusion, for examplc, the commentary
of Wollheim, Goodman, Wartofsky, Scruton, Wilkerson, Schier, and Mitchell
(amongst others) might not exisl.
The truth is that Woodfield's use of the terms 'controversy' and 'controversial'
has little argumentative and ideological, and no cmotional charge. Critical
minimalism and partiality might succeed in idealising by giving the writings an
ahistorical and benign omniscience-the essential Gomhrich on essentials-but
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it is not without its cost. 'Essential writings' rescued from the nux in this way can
have all the summary efficiency of a funeral oration or obituary; the sort of
volume that one might find buried in a cylinder for future cultural historians or
invading Martians to know and to commemorate the work of a major aesthetician
and art historian of twentieth-century Western Europe, Earth. Like GOlilbrich
himself on the images of homo sapiens projected into space for aliens by NASA
scientists in 1972, however, one fccls bound to object that the want of a vital
perceptual context only impoverishes the selective images, occasionally to the
point of unintelligibility (p.54). That some editorial attempt should be made to
place the work in critical history, in other words, is surely encouraged hy
Gomhrich's own, qualified historicism, in which 'schema' historically condition
and confine the possibilities of physical vision and pictorial/iconic reproduction,
rather as Kuhn's 'paradigm.. ' and Popper's 'hypotheses' condition amI confine
scientific 'seeing'.
Woodfield, then, occasionally conspires with Gombrich to pass off as pluralism
or an Aristotelian compromise what on closer examination proves to he either a
contradiction or a calculated lapse of philosophieaI rigour-inthe 'convcntionalist'
debate, notoriously. Having said that, howcver, I would risk my own contradiction
by arguing that Gomhrich's strength, not to say sanity, is precisely in his refusal to
commit himsclfto what presents as 'inevitahle' from a logical or theoretical point
of view when it flies in the face of the experience and discriminations of common
sense or consensus. 'I would contend thai neither the Courts of Law nor the
Courts of Criticism could continue to function if we really let go of the notion of
intended meaning', he writes (p.461), casually summing up the centrality of
authorial responsibility to the only ethical humanism able to justify the act of
thinking and writing at all. If there are occasions on which he presumes an
invulnerability and appears to know everything, most often Gombrich proceeds
with a genuine intellectual humility and presumes to know little or nothing, as if
there really were a 'common pursuit of true judgement' in which disagreement
could take place without insult. The one time that Gombrich betrays anything
vaguely resembling bad temper is in The Story ofArl when he expresses a fear that
his own ideas might be misappropriated by pretentious, half-educated connoisscurs
of art who rely upon fashionable obfuscations (pp.78-80).
I began by saying this could hardly be a review in the usual academic sense of
an account ofa recenlly published and unfamiliar text involving an open meditation
on its scholarly and/or argumentative adequacy; 'GOMBRICH, E(rnst} H(ans
Josef)', has already entered the museum of print culture's historical anthologies,
dictionaries and encyclopredias. I would conclude, however, by insisting that the
good not be interred with Caesar's bones; by protesting that these writings contain
ideas and qualities that resist the devaluations to which scholarship and philosophy
are necessarily subject and that this volume be used rather prospectively than
retrospectively. The clear and unpretentious theoretieal intelligence that Gombrich
shares with many of the critical thinkers about art and culture of his generation,
for example, along with his refusal to allow speculation to carry him beyond
common experience or useful discrimination, these are precisely what so much
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literary and aesthetic theory subsequent to his major work has lacked. I believe
that Gombrich's work is and should remain exemplary of the possibilities of
humane learning as an ethos not exhausted by the term ideology; a humane
learning that is genuinely, creatively intelligent without feding impelled to
manufacture ingenuities out ofprevailing sophistications and genuinely contentious
and progressive without becoming wilfully narrow or narrowly competitive.
As with the initially alien works whose individual appeal Gombrich's own
historicist perspectivism did so much to help us recover-from oblivion, first;
from' Art' as an abstract; finally from 'the spirit of the age'-history can help to
explain Gombrich but should not be allowed to explain him away. 'There is really
no such thing as Art. There are only artists' (p.65). There may prove to be really
no such things as Aesthetics and Art History, only writers about art. Of these, E.
H. Gombrich is pre-eminently one.
William Christie
Michael Krausz, Rightne.. and Reasons: interpretation in cultural
practices, Ithaca, NY: CorneU University Press, 1993; Joseph Margolis,
Interpretation Radical But Not Unndy: the new puzzle of the arts and
history, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1995; Robert Stecker, 'The constructivist's dilemma', The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55 (1997): 43-52-
In a wide-ranging work, Joseph Margolis articulates a body of bold theses in
metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of art and history. Centrally,
these are (pp.2-7) that reality is 'cognitively intransparent', that reality and
human thought are 'symbiotized' and 'historicized', that thinking is 'preformed',
and that cultural entities (including persons) have histories rather than natures.
Margolis thinks (p.47) that to maintain these theses it will be necess:lry to
abandon the principle of the excluded middle, extensionalism, and physicalism,
in favour of a doctrine of culturally emergent 'Intentional' (with a capital 'I')
properties that can be constituted and altered hy the processes of interpretation. In
line with his central positions, he propounds a theory of interpretation that
sympathises with certain positions advanced hy Roland Darthes (his idea of
writerly reading) and Jacques Derrida. Along the way he manages some very
effective critiques of (among others) Gadamer on the 'classical' as some sort of
interpretive norm, Michael Riffaterre on intertextuality, Stanley Rosen on
contemporary theories of interpretation, Sartre on culture and nature, de Man on
fiction and reality, and Danto on transfiguration and constitution, along with other
unfortunates.
Margolis's theory of interpretation addresses the questions 'How can we refer
to a text given that it has no fixed "nature"?'; 'How is a text first constituted as
such?'; 'How can interpretation alter a text's "nature"?'. His answers to these
questions are outlined on p.86 where he says of (literary) texts that, while they
have no invariant nature each text can be identified through a relatively stable
verhal medium which is open to interpretation. The 'nature' of any text can
change when a precursor phase of that text gets interpreted. Interpretation is open-
ended and depends on the power of the verbal medium and the history of
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interpretation to absorb evolving cultural saliencies. It is subject to no invariant
constraints. Thus according to him a text changes its 'nature' while retaining its
identity when it is subjected to an evolving succession of interpretations.
This model of interpretation seems excessively linear and cumulative. In
reality interpretive histories are not so simple; they are spread out in space as well
as in time, and for this reason can fail to exhibit the straightforward cumulative
pattern Margolis favours. Traditions of interpreting the same text diverge and re-
converge. It is clearly possible for interpreters either to be ignorant of some past
interpretations of their text or to deliberately set them aside. Berkoffs production
of Coriolanus flouted traditional approaches to the play, and will no doubt be
ignored by some future directors. BUI Margolis seems to take the object of
interpretation, a la Gadamcr, in an objective historical sense-that is, as located
in its tradition whether or not interpret~rs are aware of, and defer to, that tradition.
If p.86 is taken as delimiting the class of literary texts then we could define
Margolis's literary texts recursively as either (i) the verbal medium of a literary
work, or (ii) the result of interpreting a text. Making allowances for generalising
this beyond the literary case, such a recursive definition does indeed imply
Margolis's thesis (p.26) that texts include both what interpretation is practised on
(the objects of interpretation) and whatever is constituted interpretively as a text
(the products of interpretation). Every text would then he traceahle hack to a base
text (a member of the base class (i) in the recursion), and Margolis wants to
identify each text by its base text. If it wer..: \'ot for this claim about identification,
it seems we would simply have one sense of 'text' defined recursively. But given
the claim about identification, it seems we have strictly speaking two senses-the
narrow sense which includes only the identilicatory referents of all texts, and the
broad sense which includes all texts, even those that have to be identified by
reference to texts other than themsel ves. What is not clear is why Margolis thinks
it necessary to identify all texts by reference to a member of his base class. Surely
it would be more in keeping with his generally post-structuralist stance to allow as
the input of one interpretation the output of another, without reference back to a
legitimating origin.
Michael Krausz treats many of the same themes as Margolis and is, like him, a
'constructivist' in Stecker's sense: the process of interpretation is thought of as
endowing its object with new properties, or as making salient some of its ohject's
properties. But there are striking differences in style and methodology between
the two authors. While Margolis cites a multitude of philosophers both analytical
and continental, Krausz's citations are exclusively from the analytical tradition.
Ilis is the familiar analytical style of detailed discussion of points one at a time, in
contrast to the broad sweep of Margolis's paragraphs. And Krausz insists (contrary
to Margolis) that ontology is independent of the issue of multiplism versus
singularism.
Like Margolis, Krausz favours interpretive multiplism, which is the view that
for some objects of interpretation there is a plurality of ideally admissible
(incorrunensurable) interpretations. He makes the point that this view is not
entailed by the fact that objects underdetermine their interpretations.
When interpretations compete they are (according to Krausz) about sufficiently
similar objects-of-interpretation, not ahout the same object. for example, in
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discussing a line-drawing which can be seen either as two facing heads or as a
vase, Krausz states 'the object-of-interpretatlOn is understood in terms· of its
imputed properties' (p.68). Now it is true that different aspects of the drawing
become salient in the two interpretations, and that if there are different saliences
there are different intentional objects. Further it is true that 'the interpretation-
face or vase-prompts one to impute salience to certain features of the presented
configuration, which in turn confirms the propriety of interpreting the configuration
as a face or a vase'. But if we take this to mean that there are two objects-of-
interpretation, then we need to remember that behind these distinct objects-of-
interpretation there is a single further object. This, we might say (following
Margolis), has been identified in the two interpretations. Further, we could say
that the two interpretations represent the further object differently, provided that
our concept of representation did not rule out selectivity. The imputed properties
(leading to the interpretations 'face' or 'vase') are, we can agree, part '01' the
objcct-as-represented; but they arc no part of this single further object of both
interpretations, namely the configuration of lines in the figure. (The same points
can be made with reference to Krausz's other examples-Van Gogh's The Potato
Eaters, Wordsworth's Lucy poem~. self-interpretation and interpretation of other
cultures.)
Krausz himself recognises that what he calls the object-of-interpretation (what
I call the object-as-rcpresented) is 'not spun out of nothing' but rather, 'imputational
interpretation involves scIecting features of the presented materials with which to
fashion an object-of-interpretation' (p.94). These 'presented materials' are what I
have heen calling the further object of interpretation. The important point is that
interpretation displays a three-tier structure. For present purposes I am calling the
three levels 'interpretation', 'ohject-as-represented' and 'further object'. The
labels are not vital; the number of levels is. All three are acknowledged by Krausz,
but the further object is given scant attention. Margolis, hy contrast, devotes
considerahle attention to this level.
A distinctive feature of Krausz's hook is its espousal of what he calls
imputationalism. He defines imputationalism as follows: 'The imputationalist
view holds that cultural entities are the class of their interpretations, and that there
is no object-of-interpretation independent of interpretation as such' (p.93). He
distinguishes a radical imputationalism according to which 'any particular
interpretation on a given occasion may fully constitute its object-of-interpretation'
from a moderate variety which holds merely that 'a given ohject-of-interpretation
may be constituted within webs of interpretations' (p.94).
Krausz's claim that cultural entities are the class of their interpretations is
difficult to reconcile with his constructivist account of objects-of-interpretation.
First of all, one has to ask whether hy 'cultural entities' Krausz means objects-of-
interpretation or the further objects I mentioned a moment ago. If by 'cultural
entities' Krausz means further objects such as paintings and novels, then such
entities seem to be distinguishable from the class of their interpretations: the
painting or the novel has an author and a history that in general are not the same as
the author and history of its interpretations. If on the other hand by 'cultural
entities' Krausz means objl'd:--of-interpretation, then the question is, are objects-
of-interpretation open to a plurality of interpretations? If not, then one can see
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how the object could be identical with the class of its interpretations. But it seems
that a Krauszian object-of-interpretation is open to a plurality of interpretations
because, even with its inbuilt saliences, it could be assimilated into a plurality of
different contexts. If so, the object-of-interpretation might perhaps be identified
with the class of its interpretations on the ground that any given interpretation
functions as a further determination of the relatively indeterminate object-of-
interpretation---the general principle being that an indeterminate intentional object
can be identified with the class of its possible further determinations. Whether
this view, or some alternative spelling-out of imputationalism, is intended by
Krausz, is not clear.
Robert Stecker, in his searching critique of constructivist accounts of
interpretation, discusses Krausz's book along with some of Margolis's earlier
writings. To constructivists in general, Stecker poses the question of how
interpretation can involve both construction and predication--how an interpretation
can complete an object-of-interpretation by making a claim about it. As Stecker
puts it (p.SO), 'The problem is to understand how making a claim about an object,
even an object-of-interpretation, can give it a property claimed for it'. Our three-
tier structure for interpretation provides one answer to this puzzle: the interpretation
makes a claim not about the further object but about the object-as-represented,
while the latter may go heyond the former. Interpretation does indeed involve
both construction and predication, but at different levels: the ohject-as-represented
is a construction from the further object, whereas the predicative relation holds
between the interpretation and the ohject-as-represented.
Consider Krausz's example (also discussed by Stecker) of Van Gogh's
painting The Potato Eaters. The painting gets represented differently by its
different interpreters. To H. P. Bremmer, what is salient are various formal
features including the correspondence between the memhers of the family and
their coffec-cups; and the painting thus represented is subsumed under the
interpreting concept 'interrelated unity'. H. R. Graetz's representation of
the painting, by contrast, highlights the direction and expressive content of
the subjects' gazes, the wall separating the older woman and man, the name
'Vincent' on the chair at the left, the lantern, and the steam rising from the hot
potatoes and coffee; and the painting thus represented is brought under the
concept 'expression of isolation'. Albert Lubin's representation of the painting
also takes most of the features Graetz highlights as salient, but add~ the child
in the for~ground, giving special prominence to this child, the mother and the
Vincent-figure; this is all resumed under the concept 'representation of mourning'.
Finally, Griselda Pollock represents the painting in term.. that highlight the
physical peculiarities of the peasants' faces, hands and postures; and her governing
concept is 'representation of manual labour' ,an idea that synthesises Van Gogh's
social concerns, his opposition to falsifying portrayals of peasants, and his
emphasis on the bodily effects of peasant life.
In each case, by processes of selection, suppression, highlighting and
contextualisation a representation of the painting is constructed, and this
representation is then claimed to fall under a specific interpreting concept. This
way of thinking allows interpretation to have both constructive and predicative
clements, and thus perhaps provides a solution to Stecker's puzzle. I\t the same
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time, it allows for a type of constructi ve interpretation not mentioned by Stecker-
namely where the concept, applied by the interpreter to the object-as-represented,
has itself been constructed precisely for this purpose.
Paul Thorn
Katherine T. Brueck, The Redemption of Tragedy: The Literary Vision
of Simone Weil (State University or New York Simone Weil Studies),
Albany, New York: State University orNew York Press, 1995.
Katherine Brueck has called her provocative study of Simone Weil's reflections
on literature, The Redemption afTragedy. Let us take a moment to contemplate
the title she has chosen. It imposes on us, even before we open the book, by
allowing two rich and formidable thoughts to engage one another. Awed a little,
we might suppose that this study will bring religion and art into conversation,
each venturing a privileged theme as an opening gamhil. 'Redemption' :says
religion, 'Tragedy' says art. Yet a moment's thought will tell us that the
conversation has long been going on, not between two distinct words hut within
the word 'tragedy'. When has it ever been possihlc to think of tragedy without
religion? Take the notion of catharsis, for example, without which the history of
tragic poetry would look very different; it hegins with the Orphics and Pythagoreans
and denotes a mode of mystical purgation. It is religious through and through.
True, Aristotle reset 'catharsis' in a context that devalued its mystical heritage,
yet in doing so he did not aim to disentangle tragedy from religion. The p'oint,
rather, is that certain clements of religion-Brueck calls them 'mysteries' or
'supernatural aspects' -were put out of play by the philosopher's characterisation
of tragedy. In the Poetics tragedy is construed as mimesis of a particular kilid of
human action, an unmerited fall from happiness to misery. Aristotle stresses that
the tragic hero is fUlly human, like each and every memher of the audience, and he
does so in order to explain why the action moves us. We pity the hero because he
is like us, and we are afraid because he is no different to us. In this understanding
of tragedy the gods are neither dismissed nor put in question; they arc simply of
very little interest. It is an approach to tragedy that has heen, to say the least,
highly influential.
Once this classical backdrop is in place, the title and subtitle of Katherine
Brueck's study begin to take shape as a thesis--{)r, rather, as three closely related
theses. first, despite Aristotle and all those who have followed him, tragedy has a
redemptive dimension that is irreducible to human categories: it requires us to
affirm mystery. Second, we can redeem tragedy from the naturalism that has
become normative in literary studies by stepping hack from Aristotelian to
Platonic ground. Even though Plato had a low opinion of art, he had a vision cif the
good beyond being; and literary critics need to emhrace that vision if we a're to
talk sensihly of tragedy. And third, Simone Weil can help us recover this Platonic
ground and to appreciate the supernaturalist perspective needed for a full and
deep understanding of tragedy.
Although the classical backdrop cannot be forgotten, Brueck does not draw
much attention to it. Her quarry is not Aristotelian poetics so much as romantic
and post-romantic literary criticism, and the position she wishes to defend is not
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Platonism but 'mystical Christian Platonism'. Brueck finds this position outlined
by Simone Weil in her later writings, and she thickens it through readings of
Antigone and King Lear, Oedipus Rex and Phedre. For Brueck, both Aristotle and
the (post-)romantics dismiss the supernatural and, in doing so, miss what is
central to tragic experience. The one overvalues the rational, she thinks, while the
others inflate the irrational. Correctly understood, by way of Weil, the tragedies
of Racine, Shakespeare and Sophocles dramatise relationships of hero and the
suprarational. It follows that the Hegelian approach to tragedy must be mistaken.
Antigone. forexample, is not a dialectic ofcorrect yet partial visions-responsibility
to family versus duty to the State-as Hegel maintains. The clash is between the
spheres of the human and the divine. Another stubborn misdirection is that
proposed by Nietzsche who attempts to situate tragedy wholly within the aesthetic.
Redemption does not fall within the prOVince of religion. he claims. it belongs to
art. Life is to he transfigured through beauty, not through morality, let alone
through suhmission to the divine. The consequence for Brueck is yet another
falsification of tragic experience.
Brueck does not engage closely with Aristotle, Hegel or Nietzsche, and there is
lillie philosophical subtlety in her expositions. Nor is she interesting as a reader of
contemporary criticism, which she regards as old wine put into new bOllles. Like
Aristotle, Giles Gunn does not understand the role of mystery in religion; like
Hegel. Martha Nusshaum and George Steiner fail to see that tragedy is a struggle
between right and wrong, not right and right; and like Niet7sche, Nathan Scott
confuses aesthetic and religious categories. So one does not read Brueck for the
sharpness of her arguments against others. Indeed, her grasp of contemporary
criticism is sometimes weak, not only in what it omits (Maurice Blanchot on
Weil. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe on tragedy,llarold Bloom on gnosis and literature)
hut also in what it includes. After reading several woefully inadequate pages on
structuralism and post-structuralism, we are told that 'I draw my summaries of
structuralism and the two most influential forms of poststructuralism
(deconstruction and the New Historicism) from the standard formulations provided
in Abrams, Glossary of Literary Temls (p.161 n.5). Is it too much to expect an
author to read and cite the primary sources that develop the positions she
criticises?
All up. Brueck offers little argument and a good deal of assertion. Put more
generously. she might he thought to develop a transcendental argument: only if
we accept the irreducible reality of the Christian mystery can tragedy begin to
make sense. The value of The Redemption of Tragedy would turn. then, on the
case made for the centrality of the esoteric rather than the exoteric in art,
especially tragedy. So let us see exactly what is presented. The main assumption
is that tragedy is cathartic in an esoteric sense: it purges the ego and thereby opens
the possibility ofencountering a good beyond reason. Although unmerited suffering
makes no sense when seen from a exoleric point of view, it has incomparable
value when approached from an esoteric perspective. For in acquiescing to
affliction. in the spirit lhat Christ accepted the Cross. we can experience divine
love. This is not an abstract knowledge of God but a gnosis; it results in an
enlivening of the fundus animae rather than in a conscious increase of rational
truths. Only in accepting undeserved affliction can one hope to grasp the nature of
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divine love: a self-emptying without return that we find equally in the act of
Creation and the Crucifixion. The supreme value of art is that it can lead usto a
mystical understanding of God. Great art, especially tragedy, mediates the natural
and the supernatural realms. In other words, it is a sacrament.
On Weil' s understanding, the Christian vision is essentially tragic: God allows
the just to suffer. More than that, for Weil tragedy always reserves a place for
Christianity; it is an essential possibility of tragic art, even when composed in
pagan times. For catharsis can lead to a mystical identification with Christ. Far
from being a self-contradiction, as has often been maintained, the expression
'Christian tragedy' indicates the depths of both Christianity and tragedy. Since
she subscribes to a high Christology, Weil has no difticulty regarding all those
who accept suffering as participating in the crucifixion of Christ. Whether they
are atheists or pagans, Buddhists or Muslims, is immaterial. In Karl Raimer's
succinct and challenging expression, they are 'anonymous Christians'.
The Redell/ption of Tragedy ·tends to be more compelling when discussing
Simone Weil than when reading plays. And perhaps only a Christian who is
already drawn to the mystical will be moved by the book's main thesis. The
argument that you will understand tragedy only if you accept an esoteric Christian
perspective is unlikely to make many converts. In the end, Brueck prizes art for its
use value, and like all proponents of engagement she overlooks or reduces that
aspect of art which serves no clear or definite end. There are moments when
Weil's notions of the impossible and passivity are thematised rather too quickly
for my liking, moments when Weil is made to seem more religious than she is-
one needs to weigh a remark like 'Religion in so far as it is a source of consolation
is a hindrance to true faith; and in this sense atheism is a purification '(N(ltehooks,
I. 238)-and moments when Weil's distance from the romantics and post-
romantics is exaggerated. She may not affirm 'the death of the author' as it is
usually formulated, but she does not disagree wholly with Blanchot, Barthes or
Derrida, who develop the idea in distinct ways. Consider this remark: 'A work of
art has an author, and yet, when it is perfect, there is something essentially
anonymous about it'(Noteho(lks, I, 241). Similarly, there are times when Weil
comes very close to Novalis. Here is the lena romantic: 'The intuition for poetry
has a great deal in common with the intuition for mysticism. It is the intuition for
the unique, personal, unknown, secret, excessively disclosing, the necessarily
contingent. It presents the unpresentable' (Fraglllenre und Studien [1799-1800]).
And here is Weil: 'That poem is good which one writes while keeping the
attention orientated toward the inexpressihle, qua inexpressihle'(Note/Jooks, II,
417).
To introduce Simone Weil into contemporary dehate about literature is both
timely and worthwhile. In nle Redelllpr;(ln of Tragedy. though, Weil is not
always put in the right company. and she is scripted not to listen to what others are
saying (even when there are points of agreement, even when she is downright
silly). Perhaps in time a genuine dialogue will take place.
Kevin Hart
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Frederick R. Karl, George Eliot, Voice ofa Century: A Biography, New
York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.
Frederick Karl's avowed intention is not only to show the relation between
George Eliot's life and work but to show how hoth of these, 'together, speak of
the entire century' (p.xi). Echoing Lord Acton's famous words that Eliot's works
are 'the emblem of a generation' and Basil Willey's that 'prohahly no English
writcr of the time ... more fully epitomizes the century', Karl says that 'perhaps
more than anyone elsc in the period ... she seems most representative, most
emhlematic of the ambiguities, the anguish, and divisiveness of the Vklorian era
(p.xi: cf. pp.27-28, 29). But in arguing that she recognizes the divisions of the age
because she recognized them in herself (p.xii), he appears to connate the
psychological divisions which most concern him with ideological divisions
which hardly concern him at all. Treating her fiction as autobiographical-as a
commentary on her illegal marriage, for example-he scldom sees her works as
dealing with contemporary issues other than the 'woman question'. He further
confuses his conception of her as the voice of the century by arguing, on the one
hand, that those schism~ in her were 'the very stuff of Eliot's voice' (p.28), and on
the other that the same schisms had to be healed before she could find her voice:
'She was to form a union [with Lewes) that helped heal that profound divisiveness
she felt between public and private'-shades of Ruby V. Redinger's George
Eliot: The Emergent Self (1975)-'a union, further, that allowed her, finally, to
express her sense of the century' (p.168).
If Eliot does not emerge in Karl's work as the voice of the century, she does
emerge as the woman of conlradictions that Ina Taylor duhbed her in her 1989
hiography A Woman of Contradictions: The Life (Jf Gearge Eliot. Exploiting a
point often made that the various names Eliot adopted correspond to different
selves, Karl so harps on her 'varying identities' (p.316), never convincingly
presented as incompatihle, as to suggest she is afflicted with a personality
disorder. Moreover, he runs with Rosemarie Bodenheimer's implication in The
Real Life ofMary Ann Evans: George Eliot. Her Lellers and Fieti(Jn (1994) that
Eliot's different postures suggest hypocrisy. Without any consideration of the
needs and ohsessions that might have made her simply amhivalent, without
feeling any need to reconcile 'the Eliot intellectual game' (p.3l5) with the
considerable evidence that she thoughtlruthfulness the 'highest moral hahit' ('Dr
Cumming'), he often interprets her illnesses, relationships, and other personal
malleI'S as involving assumed roles. 'She had played gaITlCs with names so
frequently that her emergence involved roles, role-playing, and acting-out, which
scrambled reality; and she was aware of the factitiousness of it all' (p.576).
In concerning him~elfwith the work of his subject, Karl undertakes to supply
a want in Gordon S. Haight's George Eliot: A Biography (1968), as well as in Ina
Taylor's A Woman (Jf C(Jntradicti(Jns. But Karl often interprets her fiction in
procrustean fashion so as to illustrate his conception of her. Appropriating one of
the least convincing of Bodenheimer's interpretations, for example, Karl is forced
to identify Eliot with a character she abhors in order to read 'Brother Jacob' as a
covert confession of what she always staunchly denied: that her fictional material
was based on stories from life. Moreover, had Karl traced the daughtcr's filial
relations from Maggie to Leonora Alcharisi, he might easily enough have reconciled
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his statement that Eliot 'helped pioneer a new path for women' (p.xiv; set: also
pp.xvii, 512) with his emphasis on her conservatism. The right questions might
have led him to see Eliot's depression and guilt as due not simply to her illegal
marriage but also to psychological problems stemming from the impossihility in
childhood of securing both acceptance and fulfilment of her potentialities-an
impossibility that doomed her to be the Antigone that Karl supposes she wants to
be (p.569). Karl's method is the more regrettable, for 'George Eliot, more than
other Victorian novelists, actually lived the fiction by which she managed to
master those facts that she found hostile' (to quote from U. C. Knoepflmachcr's
'Mr. Haight's George Eliot: "Wahrheit und Dichtung" " Victorian Studies,
1969). Eliot hcrself said 'the best history of a writer is contained in his writings'.
Andre Maurois explains in The Art of Writing that 'The need to express oneself
in writing springs from a maladjustment to life, or from an inner conflict'.
Karl's dubious conception of Eliot's life and work emerges from a welter of
matcrial presented in an equally duhious fashion. Following Ilaight, Karl gives us
an encyclopaedic assemblage of facts; unlike Ilaight, often sacrificing coherence
for completeness (see the third paragraphs on pp.497 and 608). But perhaps in an
effort to avoid the documentary quality for which Ilaight has been criticized, Karl
indulges in the even more exasperating hahit of giving free rein to an imagination
not checked by the facts, speculating wildly on anything and everything. On the
slender grounds of a headache and a reference to life with Father as hlissful, he
hypothesizes that she broke off relations with the picture restorer, not for the
eminently plausible reason she herself gave of needing to fulfil her amhition, but
to please her father (pp.80-1). Other theories for which there is no evidence are
Eliot's and Lewes's viewing of Thomie's death as their punishment (p.460);
Lewes's sense of his relation to Eliot and Agnes as 'bigamous' (p.349n); the
(typically masculine) attribution of some of Eliot's illnesses to menses or
menopause (pp.152, 361, 386, 472).
More damning are his numerous errors of fact: the statement, ignorant of
William Baker's publication of a fragment by Eliot probahly written after Lewes's
death, that she produced no copy for a novel after Daniel Deronda (p.570); the
assertion that her translation of Spinola's Ethics has never been published
(p.197); the attrihution of her words on her companionship with death hoth after
Thornie's and Lewes's deaths (pp.463, 601); the attrihution to others of her
comments that marriage between incompatible persons is dreadful and that it is
heller for her not to be rich (pp.79, 3(8); the hungling of the legend that doing
dairy work made one of Eliot's hands larger than the other (pAl). Then there is his
misreading of the novels: Maggie is said to have almost drowned early on,
Latimer to be drawn to Bertha 'because he knows how cruel she might be', and
Dorothea to have attributed Casaubon's death to her refusal to promise to carry
out his wishes (pp.337, 294,494). Karl further erodes his authority by following
Taylor in proffering imaginative construction as fact, the most conspicuous
example being his characterization of Cross during his courtship as so aggressive
a lover as to propose three times (p.620), based on nothing more than hearsay
about Eliot's twice breaking off their engagement.
Karl's failure to document anything other than quotations from Eliot's
letters also raises questions about his reliability. What, for example, is the
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evidence that George Eliot's father was mercenary (pp.31, 39), or that Eliot's
relation with Barbara Bodichon became strained (p.166n)? We might wonder
where he gets information that in the 1840s Eliot accepted proposals about
marriage, divorce, and birth control (p.73) if we had not read Taylor, who also
fails to document the information. In another case, his failure to document makes
him responsihle for perpetuating supposition as fact. Like others, he repeats
Haight's statement in The George Eliot Letters (IV: 431n) that George Eliot
considered killing off her lovers at the end of The Spanish Gypsy (p.434). But
Haight is merely extrapolating from Eliot's remark that she originally intended to
make the poem more tragic, for in a letter to me of 9 May 1984 he explains the
reasoning behind his former statement: 'I cannot think of anything more tragic
than the death of the lovers'. Karl's citing of the original source of two letters
from Maria Congreve and Edith Simeox (pp.314-5. 667,609, 680) is puzzling
since he ordinarily cites Haight's Letters or his hiography when letters appear
there. Since Karl's quotation of these leiters differs slightly from that of Ilaight, is
Karl correcting Haight?
Certain prohlem<; of style only serve to accentuate Karl's general carelessness,
m(lst importantly a tendency to expression at once sonorous and unintelligible:
from the point of view of Eliot's art, water integrates into a general association
with the female. In some complicated way, Eliot has intertwined water with
Maggie's own nature: an image in the novel which hecomes mysteriously
eonnected to something in the author. Maggie must struggle against water so
that it defines her. It is the single element she must conquer if she is to
emerge, and yet it is the 'destructive clement'. Whenever she encounters it,
she is neutralized or, finally, lost (pp.337-38; see also last paragraph on
p.552).
But nothing could he more careless than his numerous contradictions-Eliot's
childhood was generally idyllic, and her 'protestations of a happy childhood'
false (pp.14, 291,274); Thornie's illness may have kept Eliot from conccntrating
fully on Middlemarch, and her concentration on the novel did not faltcr (pp.459,
488)-and numerous redundancies: concerning parental figures in Eliot's works
(pp.20, 24, 393-94, 509), the earlier settings of Eliot's fiction (pp.9, 29, 217,274,
353,507), her lack of interest in political issues (pp.90, 151, 152-3, 20 1,217, 350,
422,434), and life expectancy in the nineteenth century (pp.27, 92, 125n, 156,
297,386,416,432).
Not even emphasis can justify the thirty-one references to Eliot's plain
appearance that I have counted. To perpetuate the common perception of Eliot as
homely, Karl reproduces the usual unnattering likenesses of her. Why do we not
more often see the photograph of her taken in 1854 or 1855, mesmeriZing hccause
radiating the 'calm, serious soul' that Emerson discerned in her? Why no likeness
that might enable us to understand, as Edith Simcox tells us, that many thought
her beautiful? I have seen this photograph only in B. C. Williams's and Taylor's
hiographies, the lalter mistakenly descrihing the likcness as a painting (Kalhleen
Adams, who possesses a copy of the original, assures me in a leiter of 30 January
1997 that it is a photograph).
To he sure, Karl's work is nOl without its redeeming features. When not
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dissecting her, he treats Eliot sympathetically, ever aware of what we sometimes
forget: that social conditions alien to our own made her suffer the torments of the
damned. We must be the more grateful for his sympathetic understanding, as it is
often missing from works of a higher order in which, as in Bodenheimer's Real
Life, dissection sometimes requires murder. Furthermore, drawing on his wide
knowledge of nineteenth-century England, Karl helps bring Eliot to life with
information about contemporaries and such contemporary mailers as 'scicntific'
notions of women's capabilities: earning power (including the equivalence in
modern currency of Eliot's earnings); the average life span; Eliot's sales figures
compared to those of other novels; the practice of reviewing; the operation of
circulating libraries. But the scholar will not find useful a work that introduces
little new material, deriving largely from other biographies (especially Haight'S.
which Karl sometimcs paraphrases) and works of literary criticism. And the
common reader will not find appealing a book whose unassimilated materials
make the 644 pages seem even more.
Since Karl's faults might seem to be the consequence of trying to carry through
too ambitious a project, the reader may like to know that 1996 saw the appearance
of a biography that masterfully assimilates all the available materials relating to
George Eliot's life, works, and times in readahle form. Rosemary Ashton inherits
the mantle of Haight, basing George £li(lt: A Life on extensive research that
yields much material never before published and documenting her book so
scrupulously as to make it a model of scholarly accuracy. But, while she gives a
fuller picture of Eliot than Haight docs by discussing the author's fiction and
place in the contemporary scene, no more than Haight does Ashton examine
Eliot's imaginative reconstruction of the facts of her life to throw light on those
facts. A work that will be enjoyed hy both the scholar and common reader, this
critical biography and Haight's complementary documentary biography will
doubtless remain the best biographies of Eliot for a long time to come. Perhaps
some day we will have a biography that, recognizing the autohiographical nature
of her works, comhines the sympathetic insight of Redinger with the trenchant
psychological analysis of Bodenheimer. Then only, when the biographer manifests
the 'personal intimacy' requisite for 'life writing' that Eliot herself notes in her
review of Carlyle's Life (I/Sterling, will we have a work that reveals the character
and mind of a woman who, though 'the most interesting of [her] characters' (Lord
Acton), still remains much of an enigma.
June Skye Szirorny
Julian Young, Nietuche'8 philo8ophy of art, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, paperback edition 1993; James J. Winchester,
Nietuche'8 Ae8thetic Turn: Reading Nietuche after Heidegger,
Deleuze, Derrida, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
One of the more ohvious characteristics of that strand of the modern philosophical
tradition known as 'continental philosophy' is the importance it has attributed to
aesthetics. It might even he said that this is one of its defining characteristics-
one of those features which marks it off from the style of English-speaking
analytic philosophy, in which aesthetics occupies a much more peripheral position.
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It is possible to imagine analytic philosophy as existing relatively unchanged in a
parallel world in which art didn't exist; it is much more difficult, however, to
think of either analytic philosophy in a world without science or continental
philosophy in a world without art or literature.
These intuitions, if correct, must rellect something of the history of these
disciplines. In this regard it could be suggested that each tradition rcnects a
different possihle reaction to the philosophical revolution effectcd in the late
cighteenth century hy Immanuel Kant, a revolution which essentially deposed the
conception of philosophy as a separate and distinct metaphysical science-a
mode of inquiry, that is, within which one allempted to figure out something
about reality by reasoning from a basis of concepts alone.
Kant's idea that concepts only yielded knowledge when linked to some sense-
given content can be seen as having pushed philosophy in the direction of
epistemology and philosophy of science-that is, in the direction of becoming a
second order discipline which rellects on rather than competes with the empirical
sciences. It is in this sense that Kant is relcvant for twentieth-century analytic
thought, with the central roles played there by epistemology and philosophy of
science. But Kant's criticism of metaphysics might also be seen as having pushed
philosophy in another direction, that of aesthetics. If empirical science had
displaced metaphysical science as that which told you ahout reality, then perhaps
mctaphysics could be saved hy conceiving of it, not as a rival science, hut as
centred on a form of activity and experience other than science-which is to say,
on art. Effectively this was the direction taken hy philosophical representatives of
early nineteenth-century German romanticism such as r-riedrich Schelling and
Arthur Schopenhauer, both of whom allrihuted to art and aesthetics a profound
metaphysical significance.
The metaphysics of early romanticism may he long gone hut the alignment of
thought with art and literature on the one hand, and with scicncc on the other, has
remained at the centre of late twentieth-century culture wars, and within these
wars it is Friedrich Nietzsche who is most championed or reviled as that nineteenth-
century figure who pursued the aesthetic model of thought to its extreme, an
cxtrcme in which philosophy, in some sense, hecomes an art form. But Nietzsche's
was a hard act to follow, both in the sense of doing-philosophcrs, unfortunately,
arc rarely literary artists of his calihre-and in the sense of understanding-how
can any sense of continuity with philosophy he preserved with so radical a switch
as that from science to art? Both of these books allempt to follow Nietzsche's
move in the second of these senses, and in so doing offer timely and thoughtful
insights as to what might be at stake in contemporary cultural battles within (and
without) the universities. Both books are clearly written and well argued (although,
on each of these criteria Young's is, I believe, the better work). r-urthcrmore,
given the array of genres and styles within which Nietzsche himself presents his
ideas, cach is rather conventionally constructed.
In Nietzsche's philosophy of art, Julian Young traces Nictzschc's thought
through what he discerns as four separate periods, each centring on a particular
text or group of texts (The Birth of Tragedy, HUI//i/n, AlI-too-hul//an, l1ze Gay
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Science, Twilight ofthe Idols), and each rel1ecting a different complex of aesthetic,
metaphysical, ethical and epistemological views. This 'biographically' constructed
account gives his book a simpler and more conventional structure titan that
chosen by Winchester. Nevertheless, Winchester's Nietl,~che'sAesthetic Tum:
Reading Nietzsche after Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida is somewhat more
conventional than its sub-title suggests. The 'reading A after B' locution is one I
have come to associate with a (sometimes real, more often imagined) theoretical
sophistication purchased hy interpreting A from within B's framework or
perspective. (What else could 'after' mean here?--that one read A in July and B
in June?) However, with this phrase Winchester secms to mean little more than to
signal his intention to offer interpretations of particular doctrines of Nietzsche
('eternal recurrence', 'will to power' and so on) which contest particular currently
popular alternatives, such as those of Heidegger on the former doctrine, Deleuze
on the latter. (In fact, the whole subtitle to me looked like something added by
SUNY's marketing division; only the sexy philosophers Heidegger, Deleuze, and
Derrida are read 'after', according to the subtitle, while inside the covers the
comparatively lesser-known interpreter of Nietzsche, Wolfgang Muller-Lauter,
receives as much, if not more attention.) After the first four chapters in which he
examines and criticises existing interpretations of major Nietzschean ideas, in the
last three Winchester develops his own alternati ve positive reading of Nietzsche.
While it is clearly Niet7$che's 'aesthetics' which is the point of contact
between these two books, as the different structures indicate, each author has
adopted a different way of coming to grips with this topic. Winchester's book
focuses Nietzsche's aesthetic mode of philosophy, his main concern heing how to
understand the nature and implications of taking the 'aesthetic turn'. It is the
comparative failure to appreciate the implications of this turn that Winchester
ohjects to in the various rival interpretations he considers. This is a somewhat
surprising but interesting line of criticism of existing Niel7.sche interpretation (of
the French, especially), and it allows Winchester to make some significant points
against the big names of 'continental' Nietzsche interpretation. However, such a
way of proceeding has its costs in terms of the restrictions it places on the ability
of the author to develop his own thesis. For me, the main prohlem with this book
was that the question of exactly what constitutes the aesthetic turn is never
directly spelt out, the reader being left mostly to figure it out for him or herself.
Thus, for example, when Winchester develops his own account of Nietzsche in
the last chapters, he focuses predominantly on Nietzsche's later works-works
which are, in a thematic sense, the least aesthetic-and advocates that we
understand them according to aesthetic criteria. But without any explicit
confrontation with what aesthetic issues mean for Nietzsche, it is only indirectly,
in the context of Winchester's objections to non-aesthetic readings, that we tend
to get a sense of what these criteria might be. In the background is the idea, now
familiar from the work of Alexander Nehamas, of Nietzsche as advocating a type
of aesthetic self-creation, the creation of oneself as a type of artwork or literary
character. But the way this is predominantly cashed out is in the challenge that it
poses to the role of truth within philosophy. For Winchester, it would seem that a
major aspect ofNietzsche's aesthetic turn, that which marks it off from conventional
philosophy, is a change in attitude towards, or relation to, truth.
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In contrast, Young's book is explicitly centrcd on Nietzsche's philosophical
aesthctics: as its title indicates it is first and foremost about Nietzsche's 'philosophy
of art'. Thus, after a very useful chapter-length summary of the metaphysics and
aesthetics of Schope:lhaucr, described as a philosopher whom Nietzsche 'breathed' ,
Young begins with a trcatment of that work which is not only Nietzsche's first
major work, but th~ work most explicitly about art-The Birth of Tragedy.
(Young's Nietzsche both starts as, and remains, a much more Schopcnhauerian
thinker than many other interpreters would allow.) With this Young is able to
plunge into the depths of Nietzsche's actual aesthctic views, not only about 'art'
in general, but about particular arts such as Greek tragedy and Wagnerian music
drama. But as Young points out, his own book cannot be 'just about aesthetics':
given the profound metaphysical significance aesthetics receives in Nietzsche's
(and Schopcnhaucr's) thought, no merely aesthetic approach could surely do
justil:~ to it. So he too has to get involved in Nietzschc's metaphysical speculations,
including importantly, his various claims about 'truth'.
Philosophy per se is, of course, meant to he radical in its unearthing and
questioning of presuppositions, and unearthing and questioning assumptions
about the nature of truth is probably about as philosophical as one can gel.
Winchester is careful in unpacking these issues in Nietzsche and exhibits a sound
awareness of how easily this line of thought can slip into vacuity and self-
contradiction. The main direction of his criticism of other interpretations seems to
be that they understand Nietzsche's questioning of truth in still too 'metaphysical'
a sense. They take Niet7_~che as predominantly making extremely radical claims
about truth-that is, as getting at some deep truths about truth. But with his
aesthetic turn, Nietzsche, according to Winchester, has largely abandoned such a
truth-based mode of philosophising. In trying to understand Nietzsche, we should
not be looking for his underlying and logically coherent claims about metaphysical
topics; or, to put it in another way, Nietzsche should not be understood as trying
to convince us, or trying to get us to believe some view or other. He is not making
truth claims to be responded to argumentatively, or in terms of belief, or doubt and
so on. The irrelevance of truth has to do with his idea that philosophy involves
self-creation, the creal ion of standards or norm~ to which one adheres. However,
any truth-centred approach to philosophy would have to rely on the appeal to
already-existing shared standards or norm~.This is apparently why Nietzsche can
be so dismissive and off-hand about 'truth'. Moreover, to complicate matters
even further, from a Niet7_~chean perspective, the appropriate response to new
norms would not be to adopt, criticise, or argue about them. Rather, it would be to
be provoked to come up with one's own accounts which would embody one's
own newly-created norm~.
Within Winchester's approach can be found elements of the 'death of the
subject' doctrine of French post-structuralism: he is not so much interested in
Nietzsche the man as in Nietzsche that self-created fiction who comes into being
in his writings. Moreover, he is not so much a single self-created character as a
'carnival of characters', a philosophcr of a 'plurality of masks'. I·lere again
Young's book contrasts with Winchester's. Clearly less sympathetic to the post-
structuralist anti-canon (Heidegger, Dcieuzc and Derrida do not even make it into
his index), Young traces successive stages in the philosophical life of Nietzsche
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the person behind the masks as expressed in the works of those stages. This
biographical approach allows Young to layout in a very convincing manner the
complex interrelation of Nietzsche's aesthetic. ethical, epistemological and
metaphysical views as they transmute through various stages. Thus the devaluation
that art undergoes in Nietzsche's 'positivistic' HUll/an, all-too-human can be
understood as a response to a change in his beliefs about the nature of science,
while his later return to art is explained in terms of a subsequent devaluing of
science brought about by the perceived sceptical consequences of his newly-
developed perspectivist epistemology! (We might say that for Young it is
Nietzsche's beliefs which drive the 'aesthetic turn' and so the role of truth in one
way or another remains fundamental.) That he is willing to deal with a person
behind the mask also allows Young to raise questions that are seemingly denied to
the more post-structuralist approach. such as the question of when Nietzsche's
claims ahout himself shOUld he understood straight-forwardly as cases of self-
deception rather than anything like 'self-creation'.
It will be clear from the above that I think that any reader seeking an account of
Niet7.sche's own aesthetics and its changing role within his broader philosophical
developmt:nt should, of these two books, read Young' s Nietz-~che's philosophy vf
art. The view of Nietzsche developed there is one that many of the authors
discussed in Winchester's book would probably reject, but Young presents a
powerful and sophisticated interpretation of Niel7_.;che's writings, and his book
deserves to he taken as offering a particularly strong challenge to those post-
structuralist views which currently tend to predominate. If, on the otlll:r hand, you
are looking for a way into the lahyrinth of these appropriations of Nietzsche
which had started with Heidegger. then Winchester's Nietl-~che'sAesthetic Tum
would provide a useful guide.
Paul Redding
Andrew McRae, God .peed the plough: The representation ofagrarian
England 1500-1660, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996.
'England is a garden', wrote Emerson (in English Traits). 'The fields combed and
rolled, appear to have been created with a hrush instead of a plough'. Not so the
English fields of Andrew McRae's recent study, in the 'Past and Present' series
from Camhridge. where the representation of rural work and folk, including the
'plowman' (as depicted on the dust-jacket), is the focus of a detailed account of an
astonishing number and variety of texts, from the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, revealing the momentous changes in agrarian life in the early modern
period. The title comes from an anonymous ballad wrilten around 1500 and the
analysis is 'grounded in a helief that practices of representation are enmeshed
with processes of material change'.
I learnt a good deal from this book and found several of its details delightful
(including the illustrations-such as the intricate map of Surrey, divided into
'hundreds'). Cambridge, too, are to be congratulated on an exemplary production.
How rare it is today to find a scholarly text (particularly one such as this, with so
many (lpportunities for error in old spelling and so forth) devoid of 'typos'.
Having said this, I found Godspeed the plough as disturhing as it is informative.
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This, of course, is not necessarily a criticism of a book. The source of my principal
concern is revealed in the chapter titles-for example, 'Agrarian communism'
and 'Husbandry manuals and agrarian improvement', but then, 'The rural vision
of Renaissance satire' and 'Rural poetics'. The book is a hybrid, hy turns
historical and literary in character. Not that this is a distinction, I imagine, that
McRae or his editor and the other contributors to 'Past and Present' would
acknowledge, being committed to 'interdisciplinary' scholarship. Literary texts
possess significance, here, in terms of their historical and political discourse;
while texts of no apparent literary merit are elevated to parity of worthiness with
great poetry because of their perceived 'cullural' significance. 'Niccties of genre'
are dismissed as such---oddly, when Renaissance texts are being discussed-yet
McRae devotes pages to the unreadable Poly-Olbion of Michael Drayton, which
contains such lines as this:
The shrubs are not of power to shecld them from the wind.
On these principles, Ben Jonson's 'To Penshurst' is of no more intrinsic value
than John Fitzherbert's Boke oj Surveying. Indeed, McRae reduces Jonson's
celebration of the moral qualities of the Sidneys and their country estate to the
presentalion of 'a landlord whose power is accentuated by his generous decision
to observe customs of hospitality'. If the poor and the tenants are invited to share
the board at Penshurst-'all come in, the farmer, and the clown [peasantj'-this
could not be the wholehearted response to a genuine expression of humane
fellow-feeling on the part of Sir Robert Sidney that Jonson's poetry celehrates in
a huoyant language reflecting that abundant generosity. It has to he a ritualised
condescension-the mere observance of 'custom'-for the purposcs of rcinforcing
the Sidneys' 'power', furthermorc, and the pcoplc's suhjcction. Complimentary
lines cannot be taken at face value:
Whose liberal board doth flow,
With all, that hospitality doth know
The poem is as duplicitous as Sidney, as Jonson conspires with him to affirm his
authority and the consequent oppression of the 'lower orders'-power and
hicrarchy, moreover, being nccessarily oppressivc. That thc regime at Pcnshurst
is different from other contemporary country houses-which is Jonson's explicit,
concluding compliment: 'their lords have built, but thy lord dwells'-also has to
be obscured on this reading lest equality of humaneness sustained by a traditional
social order be seen to be possible, let alone benevolent, even in one place.
God speed the plough, that is to say, proposes a somewhat simplistic evaluation
of the 'various and changing ways in which English men and women of the early
modern period sought to ascribe meaning and order to the economy and society of
their nati ve countryside'. (There is little about women, in fact, a mattcr to which
I shall return.) In McRae's presentation, the critics and victims of the establishmcnt
are necessarily admirable, distinguished alOOngst lhem being the ploughman as
'the embodiment of powcrlessness, humbly appealing to the better judgement of
the powerful'.
This romantic view leads to several distortingjudgcmcnts. Whcn John Wycliffe,
for example, argucs that (in Anne Hudson's paraphrase) 'only thc just have true
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possession; since the just are by definition in perfect charity, they would wish to
share their goods, whether spiritual or temporal', McRae uncritically accepts both
her extraordinary judgement that 'this is not a particularly strident position' and
Wycliffe's alleged vision of the social perfectibility of the 'just' which it entails.
One would like to know how the position could be more strident and the vision
less true to experience. Those who knew the English peasantry at first hand, such
as George Eliot (who was essentially sympathetic towards them), expose the folly
of the delusion that, by virtue of the common bond of their separation from the
corruptions of wealth and influence, they were 'in a condition to enter at once into
a millennial mode of altruism, wherein everyone is caring for everyone else and
no one for himself.\ As one of McRae's favourite sources in Christopher Hill
reminds us, the radical Milton had none of our modern democratic illusions about
'the people' and their inspired impulses.2 This is not, of course, to maintain that
the 'powerful' were not corrupt. But the shortcomings of human nature are not
confined to one social class.
The Cromwellian Corrunonwealth is presented, similarly, in God speed the
plough, as a marvellous effusion of freedom, when 'proponents of communism
were liberated from the constraints of monarchy and censorship'. How 'liberal'
was Presbyterian Calvinism, as its exponents went up and down the country
vandalising churches and closing the theatres? One set of constraints was replaced
by another, as Milton soon-and pithily-recognised: 'New Presbyter is but old
Priest writ large'. The great bogey-words of today, 'conservative' and 'traditional',
are worked very hard in God speed the plough. They arc automatically assumed to
be negative epithets, and arc set in linguistic contexts of negativity, implied or
explicit: 'The ideals of 'perfect knowledge' ... required considerahle justification
in the face of conservative criticism'; 'traditional Christian doctrine ... assumes a
strict social structure'.
C. S. Lewis, seen to be 'working within the traditional literary canon' (another
constraint offrecdom), had argued that it was 'doubtful' whether Thomas Tusser's
doggerel, Five Hundred Points ofGood Husbandry, 'is to be treated as literature'.
McRae's response that it is 'culturally significant' and was 'intended for the use
of small farmers', not 'for the entertainment of the gentry'- as if there were
something disreputable about 'entertainment' and for that class of person-does
not dispose of Lewis's objection. In his utilitarian approach to Tusser's work,
McRae seems to have imbibed the Puritanism of his chosen period; radicalism,
whenever and wherever it appears, is blithely endorsed. Montaigne's
commendation of the primitive communism of cannibals is noted, but McRae
docs not seem to perceive the irony of such praise from the wealthy French
essayist, retired at 38 to a sumptuous clultellu amongst the French vineyards
hequeathed to him by his merchant father. The first example of 'champagne
socialism'?
With regard to women (or 'gender'), McRae docs not sustain a thesis about
their position in rural life, though in a regretfUl footnote he registers his concern
about the 'gendered perspective of early modern writers' and his apprehension
that even to present it may 'perpetuate their apparent gender biases'. In other
word.., to tell the truth about the past could have unfortunate social consequences
today. He observes that the 'vast majority of texts represent agrarian England as a
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field of predominantly masculine labour and responsibility'. Surely this is simply
because the majority of agrarian labourt:rs were men, while women were 'labouring
within a gendered domestic economy' (that is, they were housewives). McRae
refers to 'the gendered discourse of the surveyor'-in other words, surveyors,
being men, wrote to them and about them. How could it have been otherwise?
Ilow many female surveyors were there in the seventeenth century? Should this
discourage women today from taking up surveying?
The regrettably 'gendered' world of the early modern period is also reinforced
by its poetry: 'the new georgic effaces the labours of women'. One must take
issue with the verb here-meaning wilfully to rub out and obliterate. The work
the poetry describes was substantially undertaken by men. To argue that it
represents a deliberate conspiracy to 'efface' contributions women made to such
work is as persuasive as it would be to suggest that midwifery manuals 'efface'
the male contribution to childbirth.
The consideration of religion is the least satisfactory component of the book. If
one is going to enter the very complell world of early seventeenth-century English
religious history, one has to step very carefully. McRae states that the period was
'redefined by Calvinism' and that 'Calvinism rose to a position of orthodoxy in
Jacobean England'. The Jacobean monarch and many of his bishops and clergy
would be startled by this observation. James had seen enough of Calvinism in
Scotland to do his utmost to thwart it in England-at the I-Iampton Court
Conference, for example. He affirmed the Divine Right of Kings and the Apostolic
Succession, as embodied in the episcopate. These doctrines were anathema to
Calvin. How 'Calvinist' was William Laud, whose rise to prominence began in
'Jacobean England'? Or Lancelot Andrewes, who refused to attend the Synod of
Dort (l618-19)? Or John Donne? Not only were they and many others in
ecclesiastical authority bitter critics of the Genevan theocracy, but within
'Calvinism' itself one has to be discriminating.
Unaccountably absent from McRae's conspectus is George Herbert (1593-
1633), the very model of the rural parish priest whose reOections on his cure
amongst agrarian workers in 'The Country Parson' and his 'Outlandish Proverbs'-
not to mention his poetry itself-are serious lacunae in God speed Ihe plough.
Arguably though by no means conclusively Calvinist in persuasion, Herbert's
religion, with its emphasis on the Atonement, its sacramenlalism and liturgical
aestheticism, was also substantially unreformed like the Anglican Protestantism
of the Elizabethan and Jacobean era. McRae's references to the English Christianity
of the time could lead the uninformed reader to reduce its complexities to the
simplicities of the 'Protestant gospellers'. But Herbert's 'High Calvinism' had
little in common with their theology and less with their worship.
Herbert's exclusion, however, is probahly a political rather than a theological
decision. His heing a son of the aristocracy, of 'power', it would be difficult to
reconcile Herbert's establishment pedigree with his pastoral solicitude for rural
folk within the political discourse of this study. One fears that, had McRae
considered Herbert, he would have had to interpret that cure of souls in the
manner of his reading of Sir Robert Sidney's hospitality-as a covert exercise of
'power' over the powerless.
McRae's criticism of Anthony Low's 'desire to separate poctry from economic
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discoursc' implics that the marriage of thc two is incvitahlc. Answering Low's
description of Tusser's Five Hundred Poinl.~ ofGood Husbandry as a 'mixture of
didacticism, forehead-knuckling, and greed', McRae praises 'Tusser's georgic'
as the expression of the transformation, of 'the individualist as the humble
ploughman working within the conservativc structures of a corporate ideology' to
the reprcsentation of 'the industrious smallholder', No doubt this is true"but as
with McRac's rejection of Lewis's critique, Low's artistic reservations are
sidestepped. God speed the plough is to be warmly reeonunended for its painstaking
historical analyses, though they are to be assessed with a sharp critical eye, To the
degrce that it ventures from the world of the plough into that of (in Emerson's
terms) the 'brush' or artist's instrument, and to the degree that it ventures into the
realms of theology, I found it less satisfactory.
Barry'Spu rr
Notes
I Westminster Review, 66, July, 1856: 53.
2 'Milton was never a democrat', Milton and the English Revolution, London,
1977, p.91.
Gale Greene, Doris Lessing: The Poetics orChange, Ann Arbor: Universi ty
or Michigan Press, 1994.
Gale Greene feels Doris Lessing has never quite been given her due. Like all
complex writers Lessing constantly challenges her readers and Greene's work
shows how critics have oflen been obtuse with regard to Lessing's style, and
intolerant and unimaginative in their responses to a writer whose impulse is
always towards change. The hard-nosed social realism of her earlier works gives
way to explorations of mysticism and science fiction, matters that western literary
tradition of the twentieth century has been reluctant to respect. Greene ably
defends Lessing against her critics with a comprehensive examination of what she
considcrs Lessing's most interesting works and in the process illustrates rewarding
ways of approaching the Lessing a?uvre.
As the title implies, this is a study of the development and pallerns of Lessing's
poetics, a poetics that demands the constant exercise of the imagination that is the
prime responsibility of us all, and the writer's raison d'e/re, It is Lessing's
constant revitalisation of imagination that Greene contends has the power to
change minds and hence livcs, as Lessing did for her generation of womcn.
Greene quotes liberally from the generation of feminist writcrs and critics for
whom Lessing was a contemporary leading light, thc female pioneers who moved
into academic institutions in the 1970s and continue to challenge, re-vision and
renew courses with their feminist and increasingly post modern perspectives,
releasing women creators from dungeons of neglect and dismissal to take their
pride of place in a variety of disciplines. As such this is testimony to Lessing's
talent from a particular perspective: that inspiring generation of feminist scholars,
the so-called second wave, .
Two introductory chapters give us in brief Lessing's life as a writer ami a
general overview of the critical reception of her work. Grecne devotes the
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following chapters to the novels she finds most interesting: the Children of
Violence series (1952-1969), which includes Landlocked (1965), and The Four-
gmed City (1969); The Golden Notebook (1962); The Summer Refore the Dark
(1973); The Memoirs of a Survivor (1974); Re: Colonised Planet 5, Shikastra
(1979); The Marriages Between Zones Three. Four, and Five (1981); The Diaries
ofJane Somers (1984); and The Good Terrorist (1985). The book has an adequate
index, footnotes that expand cogently and a bibliography with good coverage of
seminal feminist texts and secondary Lessing sources. Each chapter is prefaced
by a quotation, usually from the novel under discussion, to flag its pervading
themes. Chapters are divided by sub-headings signalling the changing topics
under discussion. This signposting is a component of Greene's style that makes
her so readable and a useful reference aid for scholars.
The quotation introducing Chapter I prepares the reader for the sense of
rupture Lessing suffers between the beloved natural landscape of her childhood in
Africa and the narrow racist colonial society she is born into. Here lies the source
of Lessing's narratives in her life and her art: her need to break free and the
alienation lihe suffers in the process. This is combined with a constant questioning
of the many ideas and philosophies that teem through her life and her books and
keep her imagination pushing boundaries constantly towards the 'something
new' that Greene finds recurring throughout Lessing's work. Modernism
challenged its artists with a 'make it new' ideology. Lessing, like many second
wave feminist writers, has reinterpreted this maxim as 're-newal', the act that poet
Adrienne Rich calls 're-vision---the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes,
of entering an old text from a new critical direction-[ which) is for women more
than a chapter in cultural history; it is an act of survival'. Greene seeks to
understand Lessing's acts of survival through the poetics of her texts: 'the texture
of her prose, the intricacy of her structures, the rich resonances of her intertextuality'
(p.33).
A brief overview of Lessing's early life is quilted together from the interviews
and journal articles that have since been brought together in Lessing's own Under
My Skin: Volullle One of My Autobiography. to 1949. This overview sheds light
on crucial events in her childhood, adolescence and early adulthood which
Lessing says have remained in her consciousness and provoked the questions she
explores in her writing. One of the most potent of these for Lessing is the mother-
father dichotomy. The pressure of her parents' incompatibility and unhappiness
developed in Lessing a sensitivity to subtext, to what goes on bcneath condoned
social structures and their politics of power, whether it bc marriage. the communist
party, or the racial divide. This, she says, is what has made her a writcr and one
who shunned formal education for the innovation and freedom of sclf-discovcry.
She developed a strong distrust of thc mineficld of language with its ability to
hide as much as it rcveals, and Greenc's critique shows how Lcssing's use of
language attempts to deconstruct ideologies.
Lessing's particular ideological portrayal of socicty is a radical critique of
Anglo-Saxon culture displaying an irony and an acerbic wit that contrasts sharply
in the immediate post-war years with the provincial sentimcntality of many of hcr
male contemporaries. Grecne follows each phase of Lessing's carecr
chronologically, showing how innovative her tcxts hccomc. She dcmonstrates
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how each of her chosen novels extends the circular structures that dominate
Lessing's work, structures 'that thwart endings and allow new beginnings' into
something different (p.221) despite their often strong 'sense of an End' (p.222).
To trace these circular and often paradoxical processes of change is to trace the
vision of a writer who believes in both commitment and the constant questioning
of it.
Lessing has steadfastly refused to be pigeon-holed, often to the chagrin of
feminists wanting to co-opt her into a movement that, with each wave, demonstrates
as many differences as similarities. Greene believes Lessing's recalcitrance to the
institutionalisation of ideas reveals a writer who has always been several steps
ahead of theory, and one whose only unwavering eonunitment is to her writing.
Greene both understands and respects this stance, while fervently believing that
Lessing's works 'require a feminist reading' (p.28)-and not only because she
centres her texts on women's consciousness and concerns. She illustrates Lessing's
feminism not as one of creating role models, but as one of exposing structures of
oppression--of race, class and sex-and revealing how they intcract to reinforce
one another. This is the power she feels Lessing's writing has to transform society
and human relationships.
Those who enjoy that warm communal generosity that often marks American
feminist endeavour will enjoy the tone of this book. It is informed and informal,
interesting and thought-provoking. Greene's style is not only informed, hut she is
lucid in her application to Lessing's work of theories, concentrating on the wide
gamut of feminisms and including formalism, intertextuality and the
psychoanalytic. She combines this with a generous inclusion of friends and
colleagues, and their experience and responses to Lessing's work. This gives her
rigorous critical acumen the relaxed amhience of a discussion between like-
minded friend.., rather than an intense academic exercise, and makes her book
accessible to all Lessing readers.
While I thoroughly enjoyed and benefited from this hook I have one particular
gripe. Greene's unbounded admiration for Lessing sometimes leads to
overstatement: 'The Golden Notebook remains the single most important work of
feminist fiction in this century' (p.14). Anticipating criticism for this, she
emphasises her belief that this is not 'hyperbole'. The superlatives merely reinforce
structures of the male-dominated western literary tradition, however, which
feminism..., among other theories, have successfully opened up and enriched in
the process, breaking down the excluding hierarchies of 'bcst-and-greatest'
structures that ignore and demote difference. Such statements by Greene undermine
her feminist practice. Every generation produces its pioneers and The Golden
Notebook is indeed an important landmark. However it is not the only one from
recent or earlier twentieth-century writing. As Greene herself makes clear, Lessing
eludes categorisation and continually distances herself from any particular stance,
feminist or otherwise, prohably fearful of labels that might henceforth confine
rather than liherate. It is one of the altitudes that endows her work with that
paradoxical comhination of commitment and freedom, of opinion as well as style,
which for me makes her wise and courageous-and one of our hrilliant writers,
certainly.
Since the publication of Greene's hook, Lessing has puhlished the first volume
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of her autobiography and another novel Love Again (1996), allesting to an
ongoing and prolific talent that includes drama, short stories, poetry and non-
fiction, as well as the 21 novels from which Greene takes her selection. Greene's
book is an important contribution in the equally prolific appraisal of this important
writer. As she suggests in her conclusion, it is unlikely that anyone book will ever
be able to bring finite conclusions to Lessing's body of work. Her mythic, shape-
changing capacities will see to that.
Jennifer Moore
Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard's Existential Aesthetics,
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1994.
Sylvia Walsh's Living Poetically is a lucid, balanced and scholarly exegesis of
Kierkegaard's existential aesthetics. It aim~ 'to reclaim Kierkegaard as a poetic
thinker and writer from those who interpret him as an ironic practitioner of an
aestheticism devoid of and detached from the ethical-religious as well as frora
those who vicw him as rejecting the poetic and acsthctic on ethical or religious
grounds' (p.4). While much Kierkegaard scholarship repeats the view that
Kierkegaard started out as an aesthete but gradually abandoned poetry in favour
of the religious, Walsh adduces overwhelming textual evidence in support of her
dual claim that Kierkegaard's writing was religious from the outset and that
Kierkegaard did not abandon poetry as a result of his apparent dialectical sublation
of the aesthetic as a mere stage on life's way. In fact he refers to him<;elf most
frequently as a poet in the journal entries corresponding to the final part of his
authorship-with over ninety references in the journals after 1847 as opposed to
a single reference in the journals prior to 1847 (p.224).
Walsh's sketches of the aesthetics of Hegel, the German romantics, and J. L.
I lei berg, are very useful for understanding the philosophical and literary context
in which Kierkegaard was writing. The explication of Kierkegaard's early polemical
works is also one of the book's strengths. It brings out the crucial notions of life-
development (Livs-Udvikling) and life-view (Livs-Ansk/lelse), and articulates
them onto the dialcctical aesthetics of Hegel and Heiberg. It also allows us to
understand the reprise of these notions in Kierkegaard's later views on the art of
living poetically within religious faith. Most importantly, Walsh gives us some
insight into Kierkegaard's 'inverted Christian dialectic' in which he used poetry
not to communicate the word of God more persuasively, but to establish more
clearly the absolute distance that separates human beings from God. This is
crucial, in Kierkegaard's theokJgy, to emphasise human reliance on God's grace
for salvation.
Living Poetically retraces the whole of Kierkegaard's (leuvre, pausing for
'close textual analysis of major works in all periods of Kierkegaard's authorship'
(p.I). This allows for a detailed and systematic pursuit of the overall argument of
the book, but it also risks lapsing into fairly pedestrian summaries of some of
Kierkegaard's works. In fact much of the discussion of the works between Fear
and Trembling and Stages on Life's Way lapses in this way. The extent of these
close textual analyses diminishes markedly during the course of the book, so that
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the 'third and final phase in Kierkegaard's understanding of the poetic ... in the
journals and specifically religious writings' (p.223) is treated rather perfunctorily
in only twenty pages. This is about the same amount of space as that devoted to
From the Papers of One Still Living, a rather slight work compared to The
Sickness Unto Death, Armed Neutrality, Practice in Christianity, Fnr Self-
Examination, Judge For Yourself! and The Instant, all of which belong to the final
phase of Kierkegaard' s authorship. The space devoted to the latter is about one
third of the space devoted to Either/Or, which deservedly receives a lot of
attention as the most explicitly aesthetic work. 13ut such uneven attention
undermines Walsh's contention that striving to live poetically in religious faith is
characteristic of all of Kierkegaard's writing.
By far the weakest part of Walsh's book is her attempt to apply Kierkegaard's
critique of German romanticism to 'postmodern french feminism'. Not only does
Walsh regard 'postmodernism', 'poststructuralism' and 'deconstruction' as 'a
single phenomenon' (p.245), but she reductively connates the positions of the
specific theorists she seeks to criticise, viz. Kristeva, Irigaray, and Cixous and
Clement. for example, Walsh problematically assimilates Kristeva to the French
feminists of sexual difference. Yet Kristeva explicitly repudiates the lahel 'feminist'
for herself, and aims to substitute a sexually indifferent suhject-in-process for
sexually differentiated suhjects. This position is quite different from that of
Irigaray, who adopts talk of a specifically female identity strategically, as part of
an attempt to subvert phallogocentrism. To collapse these two distinct positions
into a generic 'postmodern french feminism' which is susceptible to Kierkegaard's
(alleged) refutation of the German romantics is far too swift.
It would have heen much more interesting to make a detailed comparison of
Kierkegaard's understanding of sexual difference with those of Kristeva and
Irigaray. for example, Kristeva's 'bisexual' suhject-in-process has hoth masculine
and feminine characteristics, which correspond closely to the Kierkegaardian
categories which Walsh dubs 'the masculine mode' and 'the feminine mode'. The
former are primarily a self-relatedness and the latter primarily a relatedness to
others. But whereas Kierkegaard's sUbject-in-process is represented hy Walsh as
androgynous, Kristeva distinguishes sharply between 'hisexuality' and
'androgyny'. furthermore, Kristeva's aim is to suhvert the phallocentric identity
of the Symbolic order by rearranging the mutual relations of the semiotic (feminine)
and the symbolic (masculine). She does this hy invoking the maternal experience,
and the pre-rcdipal experience of the infant, which arc not hound to a single
identity. Kierkegaard's purpose is to uphold the existing phallocentric order by
reproducing and disseminating its distinctions, categories and values-including,
very importantly, the category of the individual. The use Kierkegaard makes of
his categories of masculine and feminine reinforces stereotypical patriarchal
positionings of women as submissive, devoted and giving. While Kierkegaard
connates the identities of woman, mother, and the feminine, Kristeva wants to
kecp these distinct. For Kristeva the maternal experience, in which the mother
shares her identity with an other, can he characterized in term~ of giving and
devotion. But in order that the woman not he abjected with the mother when the
infant asserts its autonomy, the maternal function should he distinguished from
the woman.
203
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
Another interesting area for specific comparison would he the uses to which
Kierkegaard and Irigaray put mimesis. Kierkegaard's whole pseudonymous
authorship can arguably be read as an elaborate parody of Hegel's Encyclopedia
ofthe Philosophical Sciences. This mimetic strategy to undo a hegemonic system
of thought is very similar to Irigaray's use of mimesis to deconstruct phallogocentric
texts. But Walsh glibly identifies deconstruction with Kierkegaard,s understanding
of Socratic irony as 'infinite, absolute negativity' (p.247), then dismisses it as
purely destructive and nihilistic. She might more chari tabl y have explored Irigaray' s
(and Derrida's) strategic uses of deconstruction as forms of 'mastered irony',
which expose the values at work in the unconscious of a text and open the field to
allernative constructions of power and value. Kierkegaard's irony and proto-
deconstructive techniques are interesting because, allhough they are used to
subvert one hegemonic system, they are no obstacle to Kierkegaard's support of
another (patriarchy).
I would also like to have secn a more roucauldian approach to the whole topic
of Kierkegaard's aesthetics, as opposed to the history of ideas approach which
infonns Living Poetically. The book traces the influence of particular authors on
Kierkegaard's work. It also follows the inner dialectic of the existential meanings
of Kierkegaard's ideas. But it never interrogates the position of these ideas in the
social and discursive formations of the time, or the role they play in structures of
power. So, for example, Walsh takes Don Juan to represent a universal stage in all
human lives-as do Kierkegaard and his psychoanalytic interpreters Barfoed and
Nordentoft (pp.69 fr.). This is despite the fact that they all acknowledge the
medieval origins of the Don Juan figure. It would have heen interesting to see
some work on what was specific to the social and discursive formations of the
middle ages which might have generated this fascination with the sensuous-
erotic-in the fonn of an aristocratic male seducer. Changes in laws of inheritance
(to male primogeniture), in the consolidation of the patriarchal power of the
church, and the forces that generated chivalric literature all playa part in the
genesis of the Don Juan figure. Walsh also accepts uncritically Kierkegaard's
claim that Christianity introduced 'the fundamental conflict between flesh and
spirit' into the world (p.76). This dubious distinction may be due to Zarathustra,
or Gnosticism, or Manicheism, or Buddhism-but not to Christianity as such.
However, the emphasis on it in the medieval Christian church is crucial to the
genesis of the Don Juan figure.
All of this could have been questioned had Walsh aJopted a Foucauldian
methodology rather than that of the history of ideas. rurthermore, her critique of
'post modern French feminism' would have been seen to he misplaced. The
Christian categories and values basic to Kierkegaard's sense of self-idelltity, of
sin and guilt, inherited in the line of the father, the One and Holy, are engendered
hy the patriarchal church. They rely on surveillance (the lidless eye of Goo), self-
surveillance (confession, the diary, self-review), scIf-discipline (reading, writing,
scholarship), suffering (guilt, debt, sin, anguish), and the exclusion of women
(from the ministry, from the monastic life of the devoteJ religious poet). These
values, and the lihidinal economy they map, are quintessentially masculine. They
are (re)produced by institutions such as the church, school and university (science,
Videnskab). As Foucault and Judith Butler have pointed out, the singular identities
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produced hy these institutions to fit their norms, using technologies of surveillance
and discipline, arc crucial to modem forms of power. An analysis of the discursive
origins of Don Juan, Ahasuerus and Faust-rather than their ideal origins in a
dialectic of existential types-would have revealed the technologies at work
which produced and reproduced them. and the values with which they are
associated. Kierkegaard was at least gynophobic if not misogynist hy the standards
of our present age. His powerful writing, reproduced in countless texts and
student minds, propagates phallocentric and patriarchal values. The eternal identity
sought by Kierkegaard in Christian faith, through suffering, guilt, despair and
sacrifice, is precisely what is rejected by postmodern celebrants ofjouissance and
polymorphous perversity. Walsh relies on the authority of Kierkegaard's assertion
that we need a single identity to escape the despair of fragmentation and self-
difference. But this begs the question of 'postmodern feminism'.
The exegesis of Kierkegaardian aesthetics on its own terms, as is the case with
Living Poetically, serves to obscure the values of the discursive and disciplinary
formations to which it belongs. Poststructural readings of Kierkegaard, while
perhaps at variance with Kierkegaard's intentions, at least open the possibility of
radical critique. I also think they can be articulated in non-violent and illuminating
ways onto Kierkegaardian texts, as I have suggested with rcspcct to the work of
Kristeva and Irigaray.
William McDonald
Fredric Jameson, The Seed. of Time, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994.
This new book by Fredric Jameson, based upon a series of lectures givcn in 1991
in California, continues his endeavour to present a 'Marxisant' critique of the
dominant theories of postmodernity and to elaborate a more adequate diagnosis of
our epoch, insofar as our entanglement in it permits. The three chapters of the
book in fact constitute three quite independent essays, though they were intended
by their author to supplement each other.
The first essay (' Antinomies of Postmodernity') is from a general theoretical
standpoint the most ambitious and interesting. It attempts to outline some
irresolvahle contradictions of contemporary thought and culture which, as conunon
conceptual dilemmas, underlie the diversity of particular positions anu opinions-
contradictions that completely exclude each other, yet simultaneously and without
any mediation collapse into each other.
Since for Jameson the most significant outcome of this is the immobilisation of
a social imagination imprisoned in an eternal present, the second chapter ('Utopia,
Modernity and Death') is a 'mournful' evocation of a lost past, a rccall of the
repressed idea of Utopia. More precisely, it is a recall of the idea of Utopia that
was nurtured by what Jameson calls the (now disappeared) Second World-the
world of socialist experiment and its culture. Concretely, this second chapter
deals with the literary analysis and interpretation of Andrei Platonov's novel
Chevengur, a work written in the late 1920s but not published until the 1980s.
Lastly, the concluding chapter ('The Constraints of Postmodernism')-in the
form of a typology and using architecture as an example--explores thc possibility
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of active cultural responses to the antinomies of postmodernity, indicating the
structural limitations of these responses to what for those of us in the present must
remain irresolvable.
According to the differing aim and contents of each of these threc essays, the
method exemplified by each is different: in the first chapter it is dialectical; in the
second, deep-psychological; in the third, semiotic. The reader who would recover
that reading desired by the author, however, will encounter some difficulties. Not
only are there understandable discontinuities and gaps between the three chapters,
there are also considerable conceptual obstacles to their 'unification'.
This is not the only aspect of the book that may cause frustration, however.
Another is the impenetrable opacity of many of its formulations. At the very
beginning of the volume one comes upon characterisations of our epoch like the
following: 'So it is that depth forms (if any exist, like prehistoric monsters) tend
to be projected up upon the surface in the anamorphic flatness of a scarcely
recognisable afterimage, lighting up upon the board in the form of a logical
paradox or a textual paralogism'(p.4). And what sense is one to make of the
assertions 'the contradiction is a singular substance'(p.2) and 'time is today a
function of speed'(p.8)? Nor will the reader's confidence in the author be
enhanced by a number of elementary philosophical howlers: by his declaring the
'improductivity' of Kantian antinomies on p.2, for example, or his misrepresenting
the idea of the categorical imperative on p.42; hy his completely confused
discussion of the notion of 'civil society' on pp.154-155, and so on.
Il would be unjust, however, not to acknowledge immediately that all these arc
the disturhing symptoms, not of any ineptitude on the author's part, hut of an
unrestrained rhetoric and carelessn~ss (as well as of a disrespect for the reader).
Beyond a formidable power of interpretation which is especially impressive in the
third chapter, Jameson hetrays a genuine capacity to discuss theoretical (including
philosophical) issues in both an informed and informative way. And if some
chunks of the book are (for this reader at least) impenetrably obscure, enough
remains of unquestionable theoretical interest.
Jameson offers a diagnosis of our present, of post modernity understood in an
historical and sociological sense. Though he draws a number of fine distinctions
between the modern and the postmodern, fundamental to his analysis is a
characterisation of our postmodern epoch-identified as the third, multinational,
global and informational stage of capitalism-as fully accomplishing a process of
modernisation (commodification; instrumental rationalisation; urhanisation; and
so on) which was only the project of modernity or the second, imperialist and
monopolist stage of capitalism.
Il is on this basis that he outlines the antinomies of the present. The antinomy,
first, of Time: an historically specific form of temporality in which an unparalleled
rate of change goes together with unparalleled standardisation; ahsolute change
that, because it changes nothing, is revealed as a form of stasis. Then there is the
antinomy of Space: the homogenisation of the entire world in which enclaves of
precapitalist difference are obliterated along with all boundaries, including those
hetween the urban and the provincial-an homogenisation which at the same
time, however, appears as the ground of unlimited diversity and heterogeneity.
Third, we have the antinomy of Nature: nature's disappearance as fact and as a
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valid norm, on the one hand (in antifoundationalism the idea of nature as an object
of knowledge disappears; in antiessentialism, the idea of a human nature), and on
the other, nature's simultaneous return as the object of a passionate awareness,
albeit with a repressive, disempowering character. Lastly, the antinomy of Utopia:
a virulent anti-Utopianism which 'reveals itself as a vibrant form of Utopianism
in its own right' (p.67). In each case, Jameson at least gestures towards the
disclosure of some deeper, primarily economic causes. The analysis remains
essentially that of 'patterned effects' (p.68), however, for his historical system
occludes not only the workability of an alternative future, hut the very idea of one.
This diagnosis contains a number of suggestive and noteworthy details-and
not a few non sequiturs-which cannot be discussed here. As a whole, however,
it raises a basic question: what is it exactly that is being described? Is it some
(dominant) form of theoretical discourse and ideology? Is it the characteristic
features of a mass culture's representations? Is it the typical life-experiences of
'postmodern' individuals---or perhaps even some of the constitutive characteristics
of the present social system, as yet conceptually distinct from the economic
system? Equally unclear is the question of how far this discussion refers to actual
facts (as suggested hy the characterisation of postmodernity as accomplishment)
and how far it refers only to projectively selected tendencies (as stated at some
points). The exposition in these respects seems to shift constantly from one level
to another, its referent remaining indecipherable.
This has serious consequences for the very status of Jameson's analysis. A
symhiosis of technocratic positivism and aesthetic ising nominalism characterises
the 'affirmative' ideologies of postmodernity. What they share is a suspicion of
conceptual-categorical thought, a fear of ahstractions. Only 'identity' and
'difference' survive-the most abstract and formal of categories which seem 'to
offer virtually no content in their own right' (pp.fr-7). Or so Jameson argues in his
opening critique of ideologies. And yet his critical diagnosis of our antinomies is
throughout by the categories of homogeneity and heterogeneity, which are merely
other names for identity and difference. Jameson, to be fair, clearly acknowledges
this fact (p.66). The justification he has to offer, however-that 'in a fallen or
class society ... [tlhere can he no escape from ideology' (p.77)---only raises the
old question of whether or not ideology-critique is at all reconcilable with the
supposition of the ubiquity of ideology.
Moreover, the issue itself is rendered superlluous by the fact that even this is
not consistently carried through in the text. This becomes clearest in Jameson's
discussion of Utopia. Our having rendered impossihle the very thought of a
genuinely different future, of any rationally acceptahle iuea of Utopia. is our
deepest quandary and for Jameson constitutes the defining feature of our
postmodernity. This at least is his 'official', unamhiguously anu consistently
reiterated viewpoint. It is a viewpoir.t that is no less consistently undermined hy
the text itself, however, which leaves us in no doubt whatsoever that its author
knows only too well that such a Utopian future ought to be the Marxian ideal of a
non-market society based on collective ownership and communal planning and
contro\. Not only is this explicitly asserted (p.74) hut, more importantly, it
underlies its whole critical diagnosis. Postmooernity is conceived as being nothing
other than late capitalism, its antinomies as heing rooted in the effective
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glohalisation of the principles of market and profit. Even if the actual causal
mechanism~ connecting this 'base' with the 'superstructure' arc occluded by the
system, the existence of this connection is assumed, even declared to be self-
evident (p.68).
Even this is not represented consistently, however, for when the memory of the
lost socialist Utopia is evoked, it is not this Marxian ideal but the chiliastic Utopia
of Chel'engurthat is discussed. Chevengur's Utopia is based on the premise of an
utter devastation, annihilating ·all those 'fruits of civilisation' that for Marx
constituted the soil and guarantee of the possibility and necessity of a communist
transformation. Its projected image is of a 'society' that has abolished any kind of
labouring and has not only estahlished a universal brotherhood among humans
but has, equally, 'liberated' its cattle and even the oppressed weeds who also
'want communism'. (To the novel's small community, the dim-willed inhabitants
of a completely isolated provincial town in the steppe, everything is freely
provided hy the Sun as the chief cosmic proletarian.) What Jameson fails to
mention at all in an otherwise perceptive interpretation is the fact acknowledged
by all its commentators that Platonov's novel is a response not only to Soviet
experience, but also to one of the strangest products of Russian intellectual
history: the millennial phantasmagoria of the religious eccentric Fedorov. Equally,
he fails to make it clear-and this in spite of his discussion of the 'ironic' aspects
of its Utopia-that the novel is about the necessary, internal failure of the Utopian
project even before the town is destroyed from the outside by a detachment of
Cossacks.
This is not simply a case of one-sided interpretation or, more broadly, of
theoretical inconsistency. What these omissions point to is a debilitating lack. If
postmodemity represents the capitalist homogcnisation of the world, then the
demise of the non-capitalist 'Second World' is the premise of its establishment.
Furthermore, if the immobilisation of the very thought of Utopia is postmodernity's
fundamental feature, then questions concerning the causes of and reasons for this
collapse are not only of historical but also of decisive theoretical interest. For
these were societies that e1aimed to have realised the greatest and theoretically
most significant of all Utopias--or that were driven, at least in their origin, by a
collective effort truly to do so. Jameson carefully avoids raising these issues,
other than indirectly. When he does so, however, his remarks only beg the
question: these societies, we are told, educated and structured to oppose one form
of capitalism, were undone when it mutated into its new, postmodern form
because they were unable to withstand its competitive pressures (p.76).
Elsewhere one is presented with a crude example of com;piratorial history. The
collapse of Second World communism is treated as an 'ideological achievement'
and attributed to the 'overwhelming power' of a capitalist propaganda that
identified collective control and planning 'with repression and rcnunciation, with
instinctual impoverishment' (p.30). All else aside, this is an insult to the tens of
millions whom Jameson writes off as dim-witted dupes.
Fredric Jameson is regarded, not without justification, as the most significant
Marxian or 'Marxisant' cultural critic in America. His new book, however, docs
not make joyful reading for those who still think that Marxism, in the complexity
of its traditions and history and of the lessons they offer-lessons of failure,
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certainly, but not only of failure-retains a relevance for us today. 1\ way of
thinking unwilling to face up to those traditions,that history, and the lessons of its
past cannot e:<pect---docs not deserve-a meaningful future.
Gyorgy Markus
Michael Wilding, Studies in Classic Australian Fiction (Sydney Studies
in Society and Culture 16), Sydney Studies: Leichhardt; Shoestring:
Nottingham, 1997.
Patrick White might have bccn pleasantly displeased with Michael Wilding's
Studies in Classic Australian Fiction. In this regrouping of essays on Marcus
Clarke, Henry Lawson, William Lane, Joseph furphy, Jack Lindsay, Christina
Stead and White, it is White who is the outsider, the writer whose crucifixion of
Hinunclfarb is 'grotesquely untypieal of Australian social reality', the writer
whose Voss 'inverts the historical reality of the mass killing of the privileged
white explorer' and takes a 'scandalously unrepresentative event as the basis of a
social myth'.
I am not entirely convinced by this essay, which seems a little too determined
to ignore the possihility that myths might serve other than social roles. It is,
however, concerned with 'the politics of modernism', situating White within a
larger argument:
The exclusion of the cconomic and political from the novel is a characteristic
of modernism. Confronting socialist realism with its focus on the
representatively human, on the socially progressive, on the readily intelligible,
modernism chose to privilege the alienated, the outsider, the decadent, the
deviant, celehrating human isolation and non-cooperation, expressing despair
rather than hope (p.224).
In a sense, then, the essay is a close reading of White's comment that he was
'determined to prove that the Australian novel is not necessarily the dreary, dun-
coloured offspring of journalistic realism'.
Wilding's reading of White is also what Lauric Hergenhan, in a backcover
blurb, describes as 'challenging criticism', and White is not the only one subjected
to it. Readers familiar with a landscape reading of Marcus Clarke's description of
the 'Weird Melancholy' of the Australian hush may be surprised by the possibility
that Clarke's perception owed as much to hashish as to geography. Readers
fond of a sentimental, national Lawson may not want to know that the writing
emerges from a more radical socialist commitment which is partly suppressed hy
nationalist readings. What I would have been inclined to characterise as a strand
of fatalism in Lawson's work is interpreted in tenns of 'radicalism in retreat', 'the
desolate paralysis of the radical movement', 'the climate of repression with the
defeat of the unions by the mid-nineties'. Wilding's is an interpretation which
pays close attention to particular social detail (something he admires in Lawson's
own writing), but which is also ahle to incorporate notions of the absent and
inexpressible.
The inexpressible returns in the essay on Such is Life, which argues that lhe
omission of shearers represents the omission of radical unionists and shows 'the
209
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
possibility of a politicized proletariate is absent' and that 'The verbaltahoos that
Furphy foreground~ are examples of thc huge and arbitrary system of social
control embodied in language and literature' (p.112). One of the delights of this
chapter is the way Wilding moves between Marxist and Freudian perspectives to
expose what he so astutely terms the 'parallel betwecn the inexpressible sexual
and the inexpressible political'. Atthe same time he is able to integrate the politics
and practicalities of publishing into the material of his reading, detailing how 'the
socialist exposition' was excised, leaving 'the analysis of collapse without the
uialectic of renewal'. In this way he locates Furphy's work in a tradition of the
novel of ideas, placing it with Edward Ilellamy's Looking Backward 2000-1887,
William Morris's News From Nowhere, and William Lane's The Workingman's
Paradise.
Lane, then, hecomes central to the tradition Wilding is rememhering and is
secn as 'a pioneer in the development of English language socialist realism'
crcating a narrative of education and conversion and working with materials of
evidencc and argument. Lanc's is a new rcalism, abandoning plot ('the laborious
machincry of bourgeois realism') and favouring an open cnding which is itself
rcprcscntativc of a positive socialist perspective (the 'hopc' that Patrick White
could not see among the workers). The chapter on Jack Lindsay finds another
conjunction of socialism and modernism:
Without surrendering the socialist conunitmentto a 'rcalism' of psychological
portrayal and authentic social evidencc, Lindsay has nonethcless managed to
rearrange thcse nccessary ingn:dients in such a way that the aesthetic effect is
one that breaks free from the limitations of a convcntionalized realism. And
the modernist disruption of harmonious plot and unified action in favour of
tonal juxtapositions allows Lindsay the possibility of directly introducing the
analytical. No longer docs it need to be disguiseu in point of view, in
metaphor, in symhol. Now :t can take its proper role, its own tonc. And so the
political conflicts of 164c) are foregrounded (pp.152-53).
These are also the political conflicts of the 1930s: Wilding skilfully contextualises
the novel, seeing its emphases on surveillance and control as points of contact
with the work of Conrad, 1·lasek and Kafka. At the same time, he maintains that
the novel uses 'a history that seeks analogies' (and so moves as much within
differences as within similarities) in order to show 'how capitalism established
itself over the cooperative impulses, how the cooperative impulses were
outmanoeuvred by Junto authoritarian centralism'. In this argument he finds
another inexpressihle: King Charles. Ily beginning with the execution of Charles,
Lindsay indicates that the king is an absence that allows the real political struggle
between 'emergent democracy and communism' and 'the emerging force of
Capital'.
Of Stead, Wilding remarks: 'Her aesthetic has not hecn ohviously progranunatic
and her work has rarely, if evcr, been discussed in studies of Marxist writing'
(p.220). He himself provides a reading in which Stcad's dynamic vision of social
and economic relationships is intimately connected to the character of her writing.
Her rejection of narrative pallern derives from 'her conunitmentto rendering and
revealing human motivation and behaviour' and her habit of introducing and
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naming characters who never again appcarexpresses her egalitarian understanding.
If there is a rough texture to much of Stead's writing, and an clement of political
scepticism, this too is part of her socialist realist perspective. Discussing Seven
Poor Men ofSydney, Wilding observes:
What Stead offers us is an inside picture of the uncertainties and contradictions
and uneasinesses of the left. It is not an external attack from a right wing
position. The weaknesses observed are all weaknesses the members of the
left were only too well aware of. The uncertainties, the ambiguities, are part
of the texture of that world. And it is a world in which there are many
undercurrents, many contradictions, many unexplained things: this is not the
classic nineteenth century bourgeois novel in which everything is explained,
conspiracies revealed, meanings made clear. Social activities are no longer
seen as so easily explicable (p.186).
One of the (cumulative) effects of this collection is to undo the idea of a simple
Australian realism by suggesting a tradition that is much more radical and much
more various in its literary and social visions. Yet S/lldies in Classic Australian
Fiction is not merely a work of political commitment; it is a work of historical
scholarship and cosmopolitan reference, a work in which details, large and small,
are valued equally for their literary and social reality. Perhaps this is hecause it is
also a work which displays some sympathy for the real processes of creative
writing. When, in his reading of Stead, Wilding is dissol ving the all too conventional
distinction between 'realistic' and 'symbolic', he notes that 'inventing is not a
matter of "making it up" hut of discovering the meaning of what is all around'.
Noel Rowe
Barry Spurr, Biographer's Lives-A Literary.Critical Analysis of the
Complete Prose Works ofLytton Strachey (1880-1932): A Reassessment
ofHis Achievement and Career, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1995.
Giles Lytton Strachey sought and enjoyed notoriety, and would have been
delighted to know that since his death controversy has continued to pursue him. It
focusses on the biographies which his contemporaries recognized as his chief
achievement, and for which he continues to be best known. Accordingly, there is
by now a considerahle body of literature examining Strachey's life and
achievements, and not the least achievement of Barry Spurr's hook is its thorough
and judicious conspectus of the field. But that survey is only the heginning of
Spurr's achievements. In this useful and well-written book, he makes a spirited
intervention in the continuing disagreement ahout Strachey as a hiographer, and
he also directs attention to major aspects of Strachey's achievement which have
been almost entirely ignored. In addition he subjects Strachey's writing to the
most delicate and probing analysis any Stracheyan critic has yet brought to bear.
for these contributions, this is a book to be grateful for.
Strachey's first successful book was a work of popular criticism, Landl//arks in
French Literature, hut it was his biographies, Eminent Victorians, Queen Victoria
and F./izabeth and Essex, particularly the first of these, that hrought him the public
attention he craved. He and his friends were products of Victorianism, and reacted
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against it with passionate hatred. In particular they loathed what they saw as the
life-denying influence of Victorian Christianity. For them, the very term 'Victorian'
was one of abuse, and Strachey's title Eminent ViclOrians accordingly was an
oxymoron of deeply satirical intent. He was attempting to come to terms with the
challenge posed by his parents' generation, by toppling them from their pedestal,
and he was also fanatically anti-Christian. To a British reading public which both
venerated and struggled against the achievements of the nineteenth century,
Strachey's book was a shock and a liberation.
Strachey's model was Aubrey's Brief Lives, and the essays which make up
Eminent Vu:torians are compressed, vivid and scintillating. For a reader accustomed
to labouring with yawning groans through the two- and three-volumed
hagiographies with which Victorian widows too often memorialized their
distinguished departed spouses, Strachey's vivacity and brevity came as a delicious
relief. But there was a price to be paid for his liveliness. Several of his essays,
notably those on Dr Thomas Arnold and Cardinal Manning, arc more concerned
to be amusing than to be accurate, and this is a falal naw in a biographer.
Challenged to support his claim that Dr Arnold's legs were too short for his
hody, Strachey retorted that Dr Arnold was the kind of man whose It:gs would be
too short for his body. Wishing, in the absence of evidence, 10 suggest that
Manning was promised rapid advancement ifhe converted to Roman Catholicism,
he simply invented a conversation to that effect between Manning and the Pope.
h is clear that if facts were lacking to support his argument, he was quite willing
to fabricate them. To quote Spurr, Strachey 'cunningly manipulates his sources,
invents incidents, and often omits pertinent material in a highly selective portraiture
precisely designed for the expression of his points of view' (p.2l).
And though these defects, catastrophic from the historian's point of view, arc
most obvious in Eminent Victorians, they remained a characteristic of Strachey's
biographical writing in his other major works too. He was the modern originator
of what the Canadian critic Ira Nadel has approving called 'the creative fact'. If
hiography is documentary, Strachey's form of il is docu-drama. The reader is
unwise to accept any of his 'facts' at face value. Nadel would argue thaI this docs
not matter; Spurr is rather more subtle.
'No graver charge could be made against a historian', wrote a biographer, than
that 'he wrote what was false in order to deceive'. That biographer was Strachey
himself, writing in 1905, without apparent irony. How can Spurr defend him
against the charge? The last four words of Strachey's sentence hold the key: Spurr
denies that Strachey's aim was to deceive. On the contrary, Spurr argues, Strachey's
use of 'creative facts' allowed him to penetrate to the heart of his subjects in a way
that more cautious and pedestrian biographers could not. Strachey may have got
some of his facts wrong, but his analyses of his subjects. Spurr argues. arc
unerring. Spurr admits that Strachey's essay on Dr Arnold is indefensible (p.28).
and he is dubious about some aspects of the essay on Manning; but the rest of
Strachey's biographical writing he defends. 'Strachey ... reclaimed biography
for art and true judgement. and the best hiographical work of today is in a direct
line from his example', he writes boldly (p.118).
Spurr is not alone in making this claim-Lord Skidelsky. Maynard Keynes's
biographer, called Strachey 'the father of modern biography' -but it remains a
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deeply unconvincing one. The Modem Diography shelves in our bookstores arc
not fiHed with witty, brief, inaccurate, Stracheyan volumes. Quite the reverse: the
twentieth century's production of massive, archival lives. monuments ofscholarly
accuracy, show clearly who the true father of modern biography is. Richard
Ellmann's James Joyce and Oscar Wilde, George Painter's Marcel Prot/sl, Leon
&leI's Henry James. even Holroyd's Lyl/on Sirachey (which Spurr greatly
admires and aims to complement by his own writing), are in direct line of
succession not from Strachey, but from James Boswell. Spurr's counter-argument
that Strachey's 'insistence that a human life worthy of biographical inunortality
needs to be artistically treated is patently evident in the best modern productions'
(xvii) is not a strong one: which of the many good hiographies produced before
Strachey wrote fails to treat its subject artistically?
But it is a sign of the strengths of Spurr's book that even where one disagrees
with him, his argument is put persuasively and interestingly enough to engage
attention and hold it. And where he breaks new ground, this hook becomes an
important addition to Strachey studies. In particular, he is a pioneer in the
attention he pays to Strachey's letters, to his minor critical articles, and to his
style.
Strachey was one of the great correspondents of his generation: he loved
writing and receiving letters, and his own arc consistently witty, malicious and
revealing. His best letters. as Spurr points out, were written to women-\() his
sister Pippa, to Ottoline MoreH, and to Virginia Woolf-and the femininity of his
own personality emerges clearly in these communications with clever, sensitive
women, every aspect of whose lives fascinated him. (Spurr is rather less thorough
in commenting on Strachey's letters to men: in particular. the extraordinary
letters he wrote to Leonard Woolf, one of the few heterosexual men to whom he
revealed himself fully, would have made a valuable addition to Spurr's study. In
them a different Strachey is revealed: sexually anguished, deeply angry at a world
which seemed to have rejected him, raging at God, and bitterly cont(:mptuous of
a whole range of his fellow human beings: blacks, Jews, Christians, people of any
other class than his own.)
In his letters, as in everything he wrote. Strachey honed his characteristic
writing style, and Spurr's analysis of this is original and masterly. He traces in
detail the seminal influence of the stylists Strachey most admired, from Bacon to
Samuel Butler, focussing particularly on Edward Gibbon. For it was from Gibbon,
Spurr argues persuasively, that Strachey learned the stylistic trick most consistently
typical of his writing throughout his career: the triplet. The ternary formation of
words, phrases and whole sentences, once Spurr has pointed it out, is everywhere
to be found in Strachey's writing. Even as a sixteen year old rewriting 'Little Red
Riding lIood', he would describe 'the crafty eye, the sinister jowl, and the gaunt
form of the wolf'. As a mature writer. he would descrihe the excesses of pre-
Revolutionary France in the same cumulative terms: 'the scandal of arbitrary
imprisonment, the futile barbarism of torture, the medieval abominations of the
penal code'. What might have become a monotonous literary tic in the hands of a
lesser writer becomes for Strachey a supple and infinitely various instrument, and
Spurr's analysis of it is a case-study in close and informed reading.
Equally revealing is his amusing discussion of what he terms Strachey's
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'Camp Mandarin' style, combining erudition with mincing absurdity, epigrammatic
wit with unsustainable judgements masquerading as eternal law. Strachey's
description of Michelet's writing, quoted by Spurr (p.96), can stand as self-
analysis too: 'in its strange convulsive style, its capricious and imaginative
treatment of facts, and its undisguised bias, it shows up the spcctacle of the past in
a series of lurid lightning flashes'. Spurr is of course an advocate for Strachey, but
he has too clear an eye to fail to notice and acknowledge his subject's failures as
a stylist: his weakness for cliches, which grew as he aged, and his production of
the feeblest late- Victorian poetry at a time when Eliot and Pound were revealing
the possihilities of Modernist verse to anyone who had ears to hear. But when it
came to the writing of the twentieth century, Strachey had ears of tin. It is a credit
to his fair-mindedness that Spurr is alive to the degree to which Strachey was a
literary anachronism.
His discussion of Strachey's shorter critical writings, on such diverse figures
as Racine and Pope, show, by way of balance, how penetrating and accurate a
critic Strachey was of the writing of centuries other than his own, and Spurr's
discussion should do much to bring these essays hack to scholarly attention. This
original and wide-ranging study should find a large audience. Out its dull PhD-
thesis title is unlikely to attract one, and the production of the volume, by the
Edwin Mellen Press, is of a very low standard: printing and layout are inferior to
those possible for anyone equipped with a desktop publishing program and a good
laser printer. Barry Spurr and this book deserve better.
Peter Alexander
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